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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three chapters on microeconometrics with applications to social net-
work. In the first chapter, we study identification and estimation of peer effects in a game the-
oretical social interaction model with incomplete information. We show that players’ equilib-
rium choice probabilities and peer effects can be identified in the presence of measurement errors
in network connections by exploiting the nonparametric methodology developed for nonclassical
measurement error models. Based on the identification methodology, a semiparametric estimation
method is established and applied to study the peer effects on youth alcohol drinking behaviors
using data of adolescents in the United States, our empirical findings show that peer effects will be
significantly underestimated if measurement errors are ignored.
In the second chapter, we study strategic social interaction among economic agents that are
connected through the phenomena of homophily. In particular, we measure homophily effects by
the differences between players’ socioeconomic characteristics. Under the symmetric equilibrium
selection mechanism, we establish a nonparametric approach to identify the structural model and
propose a computationally feasible two-step estimation procedure. The asymptotic properties of
the two-step estimator are derived under context of “large games", i.e., the number of players going
to infinity. Finally, we apply the identification and estimation methods to study the peer effects on
youth smoking behaviors using data of adolescents in the United States, our empirical findings
show positive and statistically significant peer effects and demonstrate the empirical importance of
including homophily effect in our model.
In the third chapter, we study bandwidth selection method for the smoothed maximum score
estimator. The smoothed maximum score estimator is a semiparametric estimator for binary re-
sponse model, which is very useful for many economics and statistics applications. The method
for selecting the smoothing parameter (bandwidth) in smoothed maximum score estimator is anal-
ogous to the plug-in method in kernel density estimation. It requires initial “pilot" values of the
bandwidth to obtain the optimal bandwidth. The method has the disadvantage of not being fully
ii
data-driven. In this paper, we propose a data-driven bandwidth selection method by minimizing
a cross-validated criterion function. Simulation results show that our proposed method performs
better than existing methods.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation develops microeconometric methods to nonparametrically identify and esti-
mate peer effects in social networks. In particular, the peer effect is modeled as strategic effect in
an incomplete information game with large number of players.
In the first chapter, we study identification and estimation of peer effects in a game theoretical
social interaction model with incomplete information. This paper is motivated by the fact that
econometric analysis of networks has long suffered the issue of measurement errors, usually in
the form of missing or spurious data in network connections. The presence of measurement errors
mainly results from the sources of network data, which predominantly are surveys and question-
naires soliciting self-reports ([1]). Applied researchers typically construct network from data and
naively treat this network as the true network of interest, ignoring the problem of measurement
errors. The main objective of this essay is to develop an econometric framework to identify and
estimate peer effects in the presence of measurement errors in network data. The identification
proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we show that under semi-anonymously symmetric equi-
librium, the CCPs can be nonparametrically identified when the number of players is fairly large.
Specifically, we prove that the game theoretical model can be fitted into the measurement error
models as proposed in [2] and [3] and then provide two different methods to identify the CCPs.
The first (point) identification method is implemented by incorporating an instrumental variable
and applying a spectral decomposition technique to the observed distributions in data and is also
the method used in the empirical application. The second (partial) identification method is devel-
oped in the case when a valid instrumental variable is not available in the data and follows the
direct misclassification proposed in [3]. After the identification of the CCPs, the second step is to
identify payoff primitives, which are shown to be point-identified using standard techniques as in
[4] and [5]. The estimation method developed in this paper is similar to [2] and is a directly ap-
plication of the semiparametric sieve maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) framework developed
in [6]. Applying the methodology developed in this paper to study adolescent behaviors in United
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States, we estimate the peer effects of teenagers’ alcohol drinking behaviors using the data from
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent an Adult Health (Add Health). In the empirical
application, we estimate peer effects on adolescent alcohol drinking behaviors using two methods:
the first one is the usual MLE ignoring measurement error and the second one is the proposed
sieve MLE. Our results indicates that when the measurement errors in network data are ignored,
the peer effects estimated using MLE are statistically significant and qualitatively similar to those
empirical results in [7] and [8], who use Add Health data and the National Education Longitudinal
Study (NELS) to study peer effects on youth behaviors. However, the estimate for peer effects is
biased in the presence of measurement errors. Using the proposed sieve estimator, we find a signif-
icant and much larger (nearly 100%) estimate of peer effects on youth alcohol drinking behaviors.
Therefore, our work also contributes to the empirical literature studying peer effects by providing
empirical evidence of the existence of measurement error in Add Health data and illustrating the
consequences when ignoring it.
In the second chapter, we study strategic social interaction among economic agents that are
connected through the phenomena of homophily. In particular, we measure homophily effects by
the differences between players’ socioeconomic characteristics. In sociology, homophily is the
principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar peo-
ple. Therefore, intuitively we would expect that for a particular player, the strategic effect from
another player’s action will be strong if they are similar to each other in terms of socioeconomic
attribute. The similarity between two players is represented by a social distance function, which
measures the difference between two players’ socioeconomic characteristics, and we restrict the
strategic effect to be decreasing as the social distance between two players increases. Motivated
by the commonly adopted data structure in the social interaction literature, the identification and
estimation strategies in this paper are developed under “a large game" setting, meaning that the
number of players in a network is fairly large. The identification proceeds in two steps. The first
step is to identify the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities (CCPs), which is guaranteed by
the symmetric equilibrium selection mechanism and conditional independence assumption. The
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second step is to identify payoff primitives. Specifically, we extend the method proposed in [9]
to the context of game theoretical models in order to identify the deterministic part of the payoff
function as a whole. The key is to establish a rank ordering property regarding CCPs, which means
that actions with higher deterministic payoffs are more likely to be chosen by players. Then by
exploring the variation of CCPs and homophily effects, direct utility and strategic effect can be
identified separately. Based upon the identification methodology, we propose a computationally
feasible two-step method to nonparametrically estimate the model primitives and establish its con-
sistency. In the empirical application, we apply our methods to study the peer effects on youth
smoking behavior using the Add Health data. We find positive and statistically significant peer
effects for all schools, which is similar to other empirical findings of peer effects on youth smok-
ing behavior using different datasets. See e.g., [10] and [11]. Our empirical finding indicates that
smoking behavior from a student’s schoolmates will make that student more likely to consume
cigarette. We also compare the empirical results with and without imposing the homophily effects,
the comparison indicates that without considering the homophily effects, most of the estimated
peer effects become insignificant, which demonstrates the empirical importance of including ho-
mophily effects in our model.
In the third chapter, we study bandwidth selection method for the smoothed maximum score
estimator. The smoothed maximum score estimator is proposed by [12] and is a semiparametric
estimator for binary response model. Binary response models are very useful for many economics
and statistics applications. See [13] for a review of econometric applications of binary response
models. In this model, we do not impose parametric assumptions on the distribution of the error
term. Therefore, the parameter of interest cannot be estimated by maximum likelihood method
that has been widely used for probit and logit models. If the error term and covariates are inde-
pendent of each other, various semiparametric methods (e.g., [14], [15], [16] and [17]) can be used
to obtain a consistent estimator of β. The maximum score estimator (MS) of [18, 19] allows for
the dependence of the distribution of u on x in an unknown and general way (heteroskedasticity of
an unknown form). However, since the objective function is discontinuous, the convergence rate
3
of the maximum score estimator is n−1/3, and its limiting distribution is non-standard ([20]). [12]
develops a smoothed version of Manski’s maximum score estimator, which is asymptotically nor-
mal and has a faster convergence rate. The convergence rate could approach n−1/2, depending on
the strength of certain smoothness conditions. The idea of Horowitz’s smoothed maximum score
estimator (SMS) is analogous to the nonparametric estimation of cumulative distribution function
(CDF), and involves replacing the indicator function by a continuously differentiable function in
the objective function of the maximum score estimation. The continuously differentiable function
retains the essential features of an indicator function. It is generally acknowledged that kernel
smoothing method can be very sensitive to the selection of bandwidth. Different bandwidths can
lead to completely different results. In terms of bandwidth selection, [12] proposes a method that
is analogous to the plug-in method in kernel density estimation.The method requires initial “pilot"
values of the bandwidth to compute the SMS estimator, and then uses this estimator to obtain the
optimal bandwidth. This method has the disadvantage of not being fully data-driven, since the es-
timated optimal bandwidth depends on the initial selection of bandwidth. In this paper, we propose
an alternative method to obtain the bandwidth. Unlike the conventional plug-in method, we choose
the bandwidth by minimizing a cross-validated criterion function. It is completely data-driven and
does not require the selection of the initial bandwidth. We use Monte Carlo simulations to examine
the finite sample performance of our proposed method. The results show that our proposed method
performs better than existing methods.
4
2. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF PEER EFFECTS IN MIS-MEASURED
SOCIAL NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing body of literature studies social networks and their implications for
economic outcomes, see e.g., [21] for an extensive review of the literature. A social network is
represented by network graph, which contains a set of connections (edges) among a collection
of economic agents (nodes). For instance in a school-based friendship network, nodes will be
students and edges may represent friendship connections among them. This paper is motivated
by the fact that econometric analysis of networks has long suffered the issue of measurement
errors, usually in the form of missing or spurious data in network connections. The presence of
measurement errors mainly results from the sources of network data, which predominantly are
surveys and questionnaires soliciting self-reports ([1]). Applied researchers typically construct
network from data and naively treat this network as the true network of interest, ignoring the
problem of measurement errors. The main objective of this article is to develop an econometric
framework to identify and estimate peer effects in the presence of measurement errors in network
data.
Ever since the seminar work of [22], network-based peer effects have been studied extensively
in econometrics, see, e.g., [23], [24], [25], [26], [27] and so forth. However, most of the previous
work assumes that the observed network in data represents the true network structure. A few ex-
ceptions include [28] and [29]. Nevertheless, the difference between their work and ours is that
their methods can only handle the missing data problem by restricting the measurement errors to
be “one-sided", meaning that if two nodes are connected according to the data, then the econo-
metrician knows there are no measurement errors. However, as is mentioned in [30], in surveys
respondents sometimes reports relations that are not actually present and hence lead to spurious
network connections in the data. Our work, on the other hand, provides a unified approach to solve
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both the missing and spurious problem in network data. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
is the first to address these two problems simultaneously.
The model studied in this paper is an incomplete information game theoretical model with
binary choice. Each player’s payoff function consists of three components: direct utility from the
chosen action, peer effects from socially connected players’ actions and a stochastic component
representing payoff shocks. The payoff shocks are players’ private information with commonly
known distribution. The three components are assumed to be additively separable, similar payoff
structure has been studied in [31]. The game studied in this paper belongs to the semi-anonymous
graphical game discussed in [21] and [32], in the sense that player’s choice is influenced mainly
by the relative population of a given action among his or her neighbors and does not depend on the
specific identities of the neighbors who take the action.
It is well known that identification and estimation of empirical game with incomplete infor-
mation can be difficult when multiple equilibria exist. This is because the usual identification
and estimation methods are developed under the many-game paradigm, which requires observing
many repetitions of the same n-player game in order to identify and estimate the equilibrium condi-
tional choice probabilities (CCPs) and payoff primitives. Therefore, multiple equilibria will cause
problem under many-game setting since different equilibria may exist among the repetitions of the
same game and simply pooling those repetitions together can only allow us to identify a mixture
of CCPs under different equilibria, making it hard to recover payoff primitives from CCPs ([33]).
The identification and estimation methods in this paper are developed under the large-game setting,
i.e., the number of players going to infinity. Under the setup of large game, multiple equilibria will
no longer be problematic because we do not need to pool information cross-sectionally. At the
first glance, large-game setting makes identification and estimation of CCPs impossible since we
can only observe a single action of each player and hence do not have enough variation to identify
CCPs. The solution in this paper is to focus on the equilibria that are semi-anonymously sym-
metric, meaning that players with same characteristics and relative proportion of a given action
among her neighbors will have same (ex-ante) probabilities for choosing an action in equilibrium.
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Consequently, players with same characteristics and relative proportion of a given action among
his or her neighbors can be viewed as same-type players and equilibrium actions of those players
will generate variations that can help identify the CCPs.
The identification proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we show that under semi-anonymously
symmetric equilibrium, the CCPs can be nonparametrically identified when the number of players
is fairly large. Specifically, we prove that the game theoretical model can be fitted into the measure-
ment error models as proposed in [2] and [3] and then provide two different methods to identify
the CCPs. The first (point) identification method is implemented by incorporating an instrumental
variable and applying a spectral decomposition technique to the observed distributions in data and
is also the method used in the empirical application. The second (partial) identification method is
developed in the case when a valid instrumental variable is not available in the data and follows
the direct misclassification proposed in [3]. After the identification of the CCPs, the second step is
to identify payoff primitives, which are shown to be point-identified using standard techniques as
in [4] and [5].
It is worth mentioning that the identification of CCPs does not trivially follows [2] and [3]
because in our model, the CCPs are conditional on all player’s characteristics and the network
structure. The network structure is represented by an n× n random matrix, where n is the sample
size. Therefore, the dimension of measurement errors will also be n × n, resulting in a high
dimensionality problem and the results in [2] and [3] cannot be directly applied since their methods
requires the dimension of measurement errors to be fixed. Recent development in high dimensional
measurement errors models all focus on linear models , see, e.g., [34] and [35]. Hence neither can
their methods be applied to the nonlinear model in this paper. In this paper, we solve the high
dimensionality problem by requiring all equilibria to be semi-anonymously symmetric and prove
that as long as the number of players is fairly large, the CCPs are asymptotically equivalent to the
ones that are only conditional on each player’s own characteristics and a scalar valued function
summarizing actions of her neighbors. Similar idea has been proposed in [36] and [37] in studying
network formation models. We extend their ideas to the context of our model by allowing the
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CCPs to be conditional not only players’ own characteristics, but also a scalar valued function for
the actions of their neighbors in the network.
The estimation method developed in this paper is similar to [2] and is a directly application
of the semiparametric sieve maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) framework developed in [6].
Under the setup of our model, the observed data is weakly dependent conditional on all public
information in the game. We show that the sieve MLE framework developed in [2] under inde-
pendent and identical distributed (i.i.d) data context can be extended to the (conditional) weakly
dependent case and establish its consistency and asymptotic distribution. The Monte Carlo exper-
iments demonstrate that our proposed estimator performs well in finite samples.
Applying the methodology developed in this paper to study adolescent behaviors in United
States, we estimate the peer effects of teenagers’ alcohol drinking behaviors using the data from
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent an Adult Health (Add Health). The Add Health is a
longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in grades 7-12 in the United
States during the 1994-95 school year (Wave I). The instrument variable we use are obtained from
second wave survey, which was conducted one year after Wave I. Given that the Wave II data
was surveyed after one year of Wave I, it is convincing that the measurement errors in the two
waves are independent with each other, conditioning on the latent true value of network. Hence the
exclusion restrictions for identification are satisfied. In the empirical application, we estimate peer
effects on adolescent alcohol drinking behaviors using two methods: the first one is the usual MLE
ignoring measurement error and the second one is the sieve MLE. Our results indicates that when
the measurement errors in network data are ignored, the peer effects estimated using MLE are
statistically significant and qualitatively similar to those empirical results in [7] and [8], who use
Add Health data and the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) to study peer effects on
youth behaviors. However, the estimate for peer effects is biased in the presence of measurement
errors. Using the proposed sieve estimator, we find a significant and much larger (nearly 100%)
estimate of peer effects on youth alcohol drinking behaviors. Therefore, our work also contributes
to the empirical literature studying peer effects by providing empirical evidence of the existence of
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measurement error in Add Health data and illustrating the consequences when ignoring it.
Recently there has been some studies in measurement error issues of social network. However,
little work has been done in developing methods to identify and estimate network-based peer ef-
fects in presence of measurement errors. [30] characterize different forms of measurement errors
in network data and studies the sensitivity of network statistics to those measurement errors. [38]
study a Manski-type linear-in-means model and applies their method to investigate the peer effects
using Add Health data, which is one of the most commonly used dataset in network econometrics.
They find that even though the structure of the friendship network tends to change substantially
between two waves of the survey, the estimated peer effects are qualitatively similar. Based on
this finding, they cast doubt about relying on self-reported friendship links to study peer effects.
Nevertheless, their method can not solve the problem caused by measurement errors. [28] pro-
poses a method to point-identify the peer effects in a complete information game that also allows
the existence of measurement errors in network connections. The difference between his work and
ours is that he restricts the measurement errors to be “one-sided", meaning that if two players are
connected according to the data, then no measurement errors will exist. Consequently, his method
can not deal with the case of spurious data. [29] provide analytical and numerical examples to
illustrate the severity of the biases in estimated peer effects caused by measurement errors and pro-
pose a two-step graphical reconstruction procedure to correct the biases. Nevertheless, in order for
the graphic reconstruction procedure to be valid, the measurement errors still need to be one-sided.
Our method, on the other hand, allows the measurement errors to be two-sided, making it unique
and novel in the literature of network econometrics.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the setting and basic as-
sumptions of our model. Section 2.3 provides the (point) identification method with the help of
instrumental variable. Section 2.4 discusses the (partial) identification method without instrumen-
tal variable. Section 2.5 discusses the estimation method and establishes the asymptotic behavior
of our proposed estimator. Section 2.6 illustrates the finite sample performance of the proposed
estimator by conducting several Month Carlo experiments. Section 2.7 contains empirical analy-
9
sis of peer effects on youth alcohol drinking behaviors and Section 2.8 concludes. All proofs are
provided in Appendix A.1, and Appendix A.2 contains additional simulation results.
2.2 Model Setup
We consider a simultaneous-move incomplete information game played in a social network1.
There are n players indexed by i ∈ N , where N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of all players. In this
game, each player simultaneously chooses a discrete action Yi ∈ A ≡ {0, 1}. Let Xi ∈ X ⊂ Rd
be the vector of player i’s socioeconomic characteristics. Also let G∗ij = 1 if player i nomi-
nates j as her friend and G∗ij = 0 otherwise. Note that the edges in the network graph are di-
rected, which implies that friendship need not be symmetric, i.e., G∗ij 6= G∗ji is allowed. We use
G∗i = (G
∗
i1, G
∗
i2, · · · , G∗i,i−1, G∗i,i+1, · · · , G∗in)T ∈ {0, 1}n and G∗ = (G∗T1 , G∗T2 , · · · , G∗Tn )T ∈ G to
denote the network connections for player i and the network structure in this game, respectively.
Note that we use the superscript “ ∗ ” to emphasize that G∗ represents the true network structure
without measurement errors, which is observed by all players but remains unknown to econome-
tricians because of measurement errors. Then player i’s payoff function for choosing action 1 is
specified as
Ui1 = α(Xi) +W (YN∗i , G
∗
i )β(Xi)− i, (2.1)
where N∗i = {j|G∗ij = 1} is the set of friends of i and YN∗i denotes the vector of actions taken
by friends of i. Following the literature in empirical game with binary actions, we normalize the
payoff for action 0 to be zero, i.e., Ui0 = 0. Note that the cardinality of N∗i , denoted as |N∗i |, is
called the degree of player i. In this payoff function, W (YN∗i , N
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈N∗i Yj/|N
∗
i | ∈ [0, 1] is
a continuous and bounded function summarizing the average actions of player i’s friends and is
assumed to be known by both players and econometricians. To simplify notation we use W ∗i to
denote W (YN∗i , N
∗
i ). Note that this game is a semi-anonymous graphical game in the sense of [39]
and [21], i.e., the player’s choice is influenced mainly by the relative population of a given action
among his or her neighbors and is not dependent on the specific identities of the neighbors who
1Based on the empirical data that will be used, the social network we considered here is friendship network.
10
take the action. i is the payoff shock, which is assumed to be private information with commonly
known distribution. Let Xc ≡ (XT1 , XT2 , · · · , XTn )T ∈ X n be the matrix collecting all players’
characteristics. In order to characterize the equilibrium we first impose some assumptions
ASSUMPTION 2.2.1. (i) {i}i∈N is i.i.d with an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution
function (CDF) F(·) and bounded probability density function (PDF) f(·). (ii) {Xi}i∈N is i.i.d
with compact support X . (iii) The support of W ∗i is compact.
Assumption 2.2.1 is commonly imposed in the literature on identification and estimation of
static games with incomplete information and social interaction models (see, e.g., [31], [40] and
[27]). Condition (i) ensures the continuity of player’s equilibrium choice probabilities, which is a
necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are used to establish
the uniform convergence of the large game, which will be discussed in Section 2.3.
Since the payoff of action 0 has been normalized to be zero, in this incomplete information
game player i will choose action 1 if the expected utility of action 1 is positive, where the ex-
pectation is conditional on all the public information (Xc, G∗) and her private information i.
Therefore, any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) can be characterized by a profile of strategies
{Yi(Xc, G∗, ·)}i∈N such that for all i and i,
Yi(X
c, G∗, i) = 1 {i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗, i]} , (2.2)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. By Assumption 2.2.1, Yi and Yj will be conditionally inde-
pendent with each other for all i 6= j, and then
E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗, i] = E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗].
As a result, in any BNE the joint distribution of YN∗i conditional on i’s information (X
c, G∗, i)
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takes the form
Pr(YN∗i = yN∗i |Xc, G∗) =
∏
j∈N∗i
pj(X
c, G∗)y
∗
j (1− pj(Xc, G∗))1−y∗j (2.3)
and pi(Xc, G∗) ≡ Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]|Xc, G∗} is i’s equilibrium probability
of choosing 1 given Xc and G∗. Following the literature of empirical game with incomplete infor-
mation, instead of pure strategies we use players (ex-ante) conditional choice probabilities (CCPs)
to characterize the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium:
Definition 2.2.1. Given Xc and G∗, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a collection of CCPs
{pi(Xc, G∗)}i∈N satisfying the following conditions:
pi(X
c, G∗) = Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]|Xc, G∗}
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
The CCPs can be computed as the fixed point of the correspondence with each coordinate-
function component given by Definition 2.2.1. The fixed point is guaranteed to exist by Kakutani
Fixed-point Theorem. In general, the fixed point may not be unique so we may have multiple fixed
points and hence multiple equilibria. In this paper, the identification and estimation strategies are
developed under the “large game" setting as in Leung (2015), meaning that the number of players
in the game is approaching infinity and we do not need to pull different observations of the same
game for the purpose of identification and estimation. Therefore, multiple equilibria will no longer
be problematic and the CCPs can be identified directly from the equilibrium actions in the data if no
measurement errors are present, and payoff primitives can be identified accordingly, using standard
argument as in [40] and [27]. However, with measurement errors in the network structure, point
identification of CCPs requires additional information, which will be discussed in Section 2.3.
In this paper, we focus on equilibria that are symmetric in player’s characteristics X and W ∗,
which summarizes the actions of her friends. Specifically we introduce the definition of semi-
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anonymously symmetric equilibrium:
Definition 2.2.2. The conditional choice probabilities {pi(Xc, G∗)}i∈N are semi-anonymously
symmetric if Xi = Xj and W ∗i = W
∗
j implies that
pi(X
c, G∗) = pj(Xc, G∗) for all i, j ∈ N.
This definition implies that two players will have same (ex-ante) conditional choice probabil-
ities of choosing action 1 if they have similar characteristics and the proportion of a given action
among their neighbors are the same. Under the setup of large game, it makes sense to assume sym-
metric equilibria because otherwise we will not have sufficient variation in the data to help identify
CCPs. In semi-anonymously symmetric equilibria, players with same X and W ∗ can be viewed as
same type players and the CCP for each player can be identified by exploring the variations gen-
erated by the equilibrium actions of players sharing the same type. Therefore, the assumption of
semi-anonymously symmetric equilibria will be crucial for identification and estimation as we as-
sume only one large game is observed. In this paper, we will focus on studying semi-anonymously
symmetric BNE2.
To ensure that the semi-anonymously symmetric equilibria exist under the large game setting,
we impose the following assumptions
ASSUMPTION 2.2.2. (i) |N∗i | → ∞ as n → ∞ for all i ∈ N ; (ii) There exists a Cβ < ∞ such
that |β(Xi)| ≤ Cβ for all Xi ∈ X and all i ∈ N .
Under Assumption 2.2.2 (i), the degree of each player is unbounded, meaning that the number
of neighbors for each player goes to infinity as n → ∞. Condition (ii) requires the peer effect
β(·) to be bounded. Then the following lemma shows that W ∗i and its conditional expectation are
asymptotically equivalent.
Lemma 2.2.1. Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.2, W ∗i − E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗) = op(1).
2Formally as in [36], an equilibrium selection mechanism should be imposed in order for us to focus on semi-
anonymously symmetric equilibria, we omit this part for notational simplicity.
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Lemma 2.2.1 indicates that under the large game setting, the endogenous variable W ∗i ([22])
becomes exogenous since Xc and G∗ are independent with i. Then the following proposition
shows that there will always exist a semi-anonymously symmetric equilibrium in the large game.
Proposition 2.2.1. Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.2, there always exists a semi-anonymously sym-
metric BNE for any Xc ∈ X n and G∗ ∈ G under the large setting.
2.3 Identification with Instrumental Variable
In this section, we identify model elements {{pi(Xc, G∗)}i∈N , α(·), β(·)}. In the data the
econometrician will observe players’ equilibrium actions {Yi}i∈N 3, their socioeconomic charac-
teristics Xc and a contaminated measurement G for G∗. As is discussed in Section 2.1, the mea-
surement errors in G are caused by the missing or spurious data in network connections. Figure
2.1 below provides an graphical illustration of the missing data problem in network analysis. In
this figure, each blue node represents a player and the line (edge) connecting two nodes represents
their friendship connections. Because of missing data, the econometrician may analyze the net-
work structure in (a) even though the true network is the much more complicated one in (b), and
obviously econometric analysis based on these two structures will give us very different results.
Similarly the spurious data case can be illustrated by reversing (a) and (b) in Figure 2.1. The identi-
fication method proceeds in two steps: first we identify CCPs by exploring additional information
provided by an instrumental variable, and then in the second step we identify payoff primitives
α(·) and β(·).
2.3.1 Conditional Choice Probabilities
Since G∗ij and its counterpart Gij in the contaminated measurement G are binary, the mea-
surement errors will be nonclassical in general. Therefore, the identification of CCPs requires the
availability of an instrumental variable G′ (maybe a repeated measurement of G∗). The technical
challenge we will encounter when identifying the CCPs is the high dimensionality problem: the
dimensions of Xc and G∗ are d × n and n × n respectively, where n is the sample size. So the
3We assume that coordination failure of the equilibrium never happens in the data.
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Figure 2.1: Missing Data
(a) Network with measurement errors (b) True network
dimensions of Xc and G∗ will increase as the sample size increases. Consequently, the first step
of identification cannot directly follows the technique introduced in Hu & Schennach (2008) for
nonclassical measurement errors with fixed dimensions. Furthermore, our model is nonlinear, so
neither will recent development in the literature of high dimensional measurement error (see e.g.,
[34] and [35]) be used since they all focus on linear models. In this paper, we propose a difference
method to solve the high dimensionality problem,
The idea of our identification method is to explore the asymptotic behavior of the n-player
game when n approaches infinity. Thanks to the semi-anonymously symmetric equilibria, we can
show that the CCP of an individual converges to some limiting CCP that conditional on her own
characteristics and a scalar valued function of her friends’ behaviors. This asymptotic feature is
crucial for applying the results in [2].
From Definition 2.2.1 the probability that player i select action 1 conditional on characteristic
profile Xc and true network structure G∗ is
pi(X
c, G∗) = Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]|Xc, G∗} (2.4)
where the probability operation is calculated with respect to i. Under the semi-anonymously
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symmetric BNE, we expect pi(Xc, G∗) converges to a limit given by
pi(Xi,W
∗
i ) = Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i |Xi,W ∗i }. (2.5)
We refer pi(Xi,W ∗i ) as the CCP derived from a “large game" with infinite number of players. In
this game, conditional on her own characteristics Xi and a function W ∗i summarizing her friends’
actions, player i will choose actions myopically, without considering all other public information
in this game. The limiting CCPs can be computed as the fixed point of the correspondence with
each coordinate-function component given by (2.5). The following proposition establishes the
convergence result:
Proposition 2.3.1. Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.2, supi∈N |pi(Xc, G∗)− pi(Xi,W ∗i )| = op(1).
The intuition behind Proposition 2.3.1 is that under the semi-anonymously symmetric BNE,
players with same characteristics X and relative proportion of a given action among her friends
W ∗ can be viewed as same-type players. Consequently, for player i, her CCP pi(Xc, G∗) can be
identified by exploring the variations of equilibrium actions from players sharing the same type
with her. Under the large game setting, the information provided those variations turns out to be
the limiting CCP pi(Xi,W ∗i ). Therefore, under the large game setting instead of pi(X
c, G∗) we
can identify pi(Xi,W ∗i ), which can be done by using the technique in [2]. Let Wi = Wi(YNi , Gi)
and W ′i = Wi(YN ′i , G
′
i), where Ni and N
′
i are defined analogously to N
∗
i , as the set of friends for
i under G and G′, respectively. Let Y ,W ,W∗ andW ′ denote the supports of the distributions of
the random variables Y , W ∗, W and W ′ respectively. We consider W ∗, W and W ′ to be jointly
continuously distributed and impose the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 2.3.1. The joint density of Y and X , W ∗, W , W ′ admits a bounded density with
respect to the product measure of some dominating measure µ (defined on Y) and the Lebesgue
measure on X ×W ×W∗ ×W ′. All marginal and conditional densities are also bounded.
We use the notation fA|B(·) to denote the density of random variable A conditional on random
variable B and use lowercase letter a and b to denote the realized value for A and B. Besides, we
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use A and B to denote the support of A and B. To state the identification result, we first make
some assumptions about the conditional densities.
ASSUMPTION 2.3.2. (i) fY |X,W ∗,W,W ′(·) = fY |X,W ∗(·) and
(ii)fW |X,W ∗,W ′(·) = fW |W ∗(·) and fW ∗|X,W ′(·) = fW ∗|W ′(·) for all (Y ,X ,W ∗,W ,W ′) ∈ Y × X ×
W ×W∗ ×W ′.
Assumption 2.3.2 (i) indicates that W and W ′ do not provide any additional information about
Y than W ∗ already provides while Assumption 2.3.2 (ii) specifies that W ′ and X does not provide
any more information about W than W ∗ already provides and X does not provide any more in-
formation about W ∗ than W ′ already provides. These assumptions can be interpreted as standard
exclusion restrictions. Note that Assumption 2.3.2 is general enough to include both the classical
and nonclassical measurement error cases. If W ′ is a repeated measurement of W ∗, this assump-
tion can be implied by that the two measurements W and W ′ be mutually independent conditional
on W ∗.
To state the next assumption, it is useful to define an integral operator LA|B, which maps G(A)
to LA|Bg ∈ G(B) defined by
[LA|Bg](a) ≡
∫
fA|B(a|b)g(b)db,
where G(A) and G(B) are spaces of g(·) with domains A and B, respectively.
ASSUMPTION 2.3.3. The integral operators LW |W ∗ and LW ′|W are injective.
The operator LA|B is said to be injective if its inverse L−1A|B is defined over the range of the
operator LA|B. Intuitively it means that there is enough variation in the density of A for different
values of B. A simple example where LA|B is not injective is when fA|B(·) is fixed on A for any
B ∈ B. Injectivity assumption is weak and commonly imposed in the literature of nonparametric
IV methods. As pointed out in [2], under Assumption 2.3.1, a sufficient condition for the injectivity
of Lb|a is the bounded completeness of fA|B(·). Formally fA|B(·) is bounded complete if the only
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solution δ(a) to ∫
A
δ(a)fA|B(a|b)da = 0 for all b ∈ B
is δ(a) = 0 for all bounded δ(a) ∈ L1(A). Primitive conditions for bounded completeness can be
found in [41] and are fairly weak.
ASSUMPTION 2.3.4. For all X ∈ X , the set {Y : fY |X,W ∗(·) 6= fY |X,W˜ ∗(·)} has positive proba-
bility for any W ∗ and W˜ ∗ ∈ W∗ such that W ∗ 6= W˜ ∗.
Assumption 2.3.4 will be violated if the distribution of Y conditional on X and W ∗ is identical
at two different values of W ∗. Since Y is binary, this assumption is equivalent to a monotonicity
assumption on p(X,W ∗). For example if p(X,W ∗) is strictly monotone in W ∗, this condition will
be satisfied.
ASSUMPTION 2.3.5. There exists a known functional M such that M [fW |W ∗(·)] = W ∗ for all
W ∗ ∈ W∗.
M is a very general functional that maps a density to a real number and that defines some
measures of location. As is mentioned in [2], examples of M include, but are not limited to, the
mean, the mode, and the τ th quantile. Then following the insight in [2], we have the following
result of identification.
Proposition 2.3.2. Under Assumptions 2.3.1-2.3.5, given the true observed density fYW |X,W ′ , the
equation
fYW |X,W ′(y, w|x,w′) =
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗)fW |W ∗(w|w∗)fW ∗|W ′(w∗|w′)dw∗ (2.6)
admits a unique solution (fY |X,W ∗ , fW |W ∗ , fW ∗|W ′) for all y ∈ Y , x ∈ X , w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′.
We provide a heuristic argument of the proof here, detailed explanation can be found in [2].
Equation (2.6) can be established by Assumption 2.3.2 and then shown to define the operator
equivalence relationship
LY ;W |X,W ′ = LW |W ∗∆Y ;X,W ∗LW ∗|W ′ , (2.7)
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where LY ;W |XW ′ is defined similarly to LW |W ′ and ∆Y ;X,W ∗ is the operator mapping the function
g(W ∗) to the function fY |X,W ∗(·)g(W ∗) for given Y ∈ Y and X ∈ X . Note that by Assumption
2.3.2 and integrating (2.7) over all Y ∈ Y , we can obtain another equivalence relationship
LW |W ′ = LW |W ∗LW ∗|W ′ . (2.8)
Then by Assumption 2.3.3, equation (2.8) and rearranging terms in (2.7), we can obtain
LY ;W |X,W ′L−1W |W ′ = LW |W ∗∆Y ;X,W ∗L
−1
W |W ∗ ,
which means that LY ;W |X,W ′L−1W |W ′ admits an eigenvalue-eigenfunction decomposition with eigen-
values fY |X,W ∗(·) and eigenfunctions fW |W ∗(·). The uniqueness of this decomposition follows
from combining technique in spectral analysis with Assumptions 2.3.4 and 2.3.5.
By Proposition 2.3.2 we have identified fY |X,W ∗(·). Since for each i ∈ N ,
fY |X,W ∗(Yi|Xi,W ∗i ) = pi(Xi,W ∗i )Yi(1− pi(Xi,W ∗i ))1−Yi , (2.9)
pi(Xi,W
∗
i ) is identified. Hence by Proposition 2.3.1, the conditional choice probability pi(X
c, G∗)
is identified under the large game setting.
2.3.2 Payoff Primitives
In this subsection, we identify payoff primitives α(·) and β(·). The idea of identification is
to first identify v(Xi,W ∗i ) = α(Xi) + β(Xi)W
∗
i , and then α(Xi) and β(Xi) can be identified
separately by exploring the variation of W ∗i . Note that
pi(Xi,W
∗
i ) = Pr[α(Xi) + β(Xi)W
∗
i − i ≥ 0|Xi,W ∗i ]
= F|X,W ∗ [α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i ], (2.10)
where and F|X,W ∗(·) is the conditional CDF of i and we assume that it is strictly increasing.
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Let V denote the set to which the function v(·) belongs, and let F denote the set to which
F|X,W ∗(·) belongs. The identification of v(·) does not directly follows the identification of CCPs
because different values of v(·) may still lead to the same CCP, providing the existence of such
distribution functions for . Consequently, if for any two functions v and v′ in V , we can find
distributions F|X,W ∗ and F ′|X,W ∗ in F such that the pairs (v, F|X,W ∗) and (v′, F ′|X,W ∗) generate
the same conditional choice probability pi(Xc, G∗), v and v′ are said to observationally equivalent.
Definition 2.3.1. Any two functions v(·) and v′(·) in V are said to be observationally equiva-
lent if there exist F|X,W ∗(·) and F ′|X,W ∗(·) in F such that for all X ∈ X and W ∗ ∈ W∗,
F|X,W ∗ [v(X,W ∗)] = F ′|X,W ∗ [v
′(X,W ∗)]
Definition 2.3.1 implies that the set of functions indistinguishable from v(·) is
Vo.e ≡ {v′ ∈ V : ∃ F|X,W ∗ , F ′|X,W ∗ ∈ F s.t. F ′|X,W ∗ [v′(X,W ∗)] = F|X,W ∗ [v(X,W ∗)]}. (2.11)
Following the insight in [4], we provide a lemma that shows what properties V has to satisfy to
guarantee the identification of v(·) ∈ V .
Lemma 2.3.1. Vo.e = {v(X,W ∗)} if and only if there does not exist a strictly increasing function
g : v(X ,W∗) 7→ R such that v′ = g ◦ v on X ×W∗.
Lemma 2.3.1 implies that the function v is identified up to a monotone transformation, g. For
example the ratios of derivatives of v are identified. In order to identify v we can either restrict
the function g for the purpose of normalization or the set of functions v in such a way that no
two different functions in this set can be strictly increasing transformation of each other. As is
mentioned in [4], one of the normalizations is that for some given value X ∈ X ,
g(v(X,W ∗i )) = W
∗
i . (2.12)
This type of normalization can be viewed as the generalization of the identification method pro-
vided in [19]. Examples of restrictions on the set of function v include homogeneity and additive
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separability. Specifically suppose for some X ∈ X , some W ∗ ∈ W∗ and all λ > 0,
v(λX, λW
∗
) = λδ (2.13)
where v(X,W
∗
) = δ for some δ ∈ R. Then following the arguments in [9], we can show that it
is impossible to write two different functions in the set of v as strictly increasing transformation of
each other. Besides, if economic theory indicates that
v(Xi,W
∗
i ) = r(Xi) +W
∗
i (2.14)
where r(X) = δ for some X ∈ X and δ ∈ R, then again one can prove that no two different
functions v can be written as strictly increasing transformation of each other.
After the identification of v(Xi,W ∗i ), since v(Xi,W
∗
i ) = α(Xi) + β(Xi)W
∗
i and α(·), β(·)
only depend on Xi, we can separately identify the structural functions α(·) and β(·) by relying on
the information provided by two individuals with same characteristics X but different W ∗.
Theorem 2.3.1. Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.3.3, the CCPs {pi(Xc, G∗)}i∈N and the payoff primi-
tives α(·) and β(·) are nonparametrically identified.
2.4 Partial Identification without Instrumental Variable
The identification argument in the previous section depends on the availability of an instrumen-
tal variable G′. Sometimes we may not be able to find such a variable, and therefore in this section
we discuss the identification without using the instrumental variable and show that in this case the
CCPs will be partially identified.
2.4.1 Conditional Choice Probabilities
Similar to the previous section, we focus on semi-anonymously symmetric equilibrium and the
first step is to identify the limiting CCP p(X,W ∗). The identification method in this section is
closely related to the direct misclassification approach in [3], which requires the support of W ∗
to be discrete. Since W ∗ ∈ [0, w] is continuous, following An (2017) we can discretize it by the
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following method of discretization:
W ∗d =

1 if W ∗ ∈ [0, w(1)],
2 if W ∗ ∈ (w(1), w(2)],
· · ·
M if W ∗ ∈ (w(M − 1), w],
where the support of W ∗ is divided into M (M ≥ 2) intervals by the M − 1 cutoff points
w(1), w(2), · · · , w(M − 1) and satisfy 0 < w(1) < w(2) < · · · < w(M − 1) < w. Simi-
larly we can also discretize W into Wd. Both W ∗d and Wd take values fromM ≡ {1, 2, · · · ,M}
but the cutoff points for discretizing W ∗ and W can be different. By Proposition 2.3.1 we need to
identify the discretized limiting CCP p(X,W ∗d = j), j ∈M.
Specifically we characterize the relationship between the observable conditional distribution of
Wd and the unobservable conditional distribution of W ∗d as

Pr(Wd = 1|X)
...
Pr(Wd = M |X)
 =

Pr(Wd = 1|X,W ∗d = 1) · · · Pr(Wd = 1|X,W ∗d = M)
... . . .
...
Pr(Wd = M |X,W ∗d = 1) · · · Pr(Wd = M |X,W ∗d = M)


Pr(W ∗d = 1|X)
...
Pr(W ∗d = M |X)
. (2.15)
Let PW denote the column vector [Pr(Wd = j|X), j ∈ M], PW ∗ denote the column vector
[Pr(W ∗d = j|X), j ∈ M] and Ξ∗ be the matrix of elements {Pr(Wd = i|X,W ∗d = j), }i,j∈M.
Then (2.15) can be written compactly as
PW = Ξ∗PW ∗ (2.16)
Let H[Ξ∗] be the identification region of Ξ∗, which is of central importance in our identification
method and will be characterized by probabilistic constraints and constraints coming from valida-
tion studies and theories developed in economics. Examples of those constrains include restricting
Pr(Wd = j|X,W ∗d = j) to be constant and known, requiring Pr(Wd = j|X,W ∗d = j) to be
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monotonic in j and imposing a lower bound on Pr(Wd = j|X,W ∗d = j).
The intuition of identification can be summarized as follows: first notice that the discretized
CCP p(X,W ∗d = j) is related to Pr(Wd = i|X,W ∗d = j) through the law of total probability:
p(X,W ∗d = j) =
∑
i∈M
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j) ·Pr(Wd = i|X,W ∗d = j), j ∈M. (2.17)
In order to characterize the identification region of Pr(Y = 1|X,W ∗d = j), we need to first
identify Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j), which is related to the observed CCP p(X,Wd = i) and
Pr(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i) through the following relationship:
p(X,Wd = i) =
∑
j∈M
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j) · Pr(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i), i ∈M. (2.18)
Therefore, if we can identify Pr(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i), then by (2.18) we can identify Pr(Y =
1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j). Consequently, the identification of p(X,W ∗d = j) follows directly from
(2.17) and information contained in H[Ξ∗].
Following the intuition above we need to first identify Pr(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i). If we can
solve the system of equations in (2.16) and uniquely recover PW ∗ , then Pr(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i)
can be identified by combining the information in H[Ξ∗] with PW ∗ and the observed probabilities
PW . Solving (2.16) requires the matrix Ξ∗ to be full rank. Therefore, without loss of generality
we impose the following assumption
ASSUMPTION 2.4.1. For all j ∈M, P(Wd = j|X,W ∗d = j) > 12 .
Assumption 2.4.1 requires the probability of “correct reporting" to be greater than 1
2
for each
of the values that W ∗d can take. Validation studies indicate that this requirement is often satisfied in
practice. This assumption implies that for any Ξ ∈ H(Ξ∗), it is strictly diagonally dominant and
hence non-singular (Theorem 6.1.10 in [42]). Consequently, we have
PW ∗(Ξ∗) = (Ξ∗)−1PW , (2.19)
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where the parenthesis is to emphasize that PW ∗ depend on the information from Ξ∗. Let PWj (Ξ∗)
denote the jth element of PW ∗(Ξ∗) and similarly define PW ∗i and Ξ∗ij , and then the identification
results are given in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4.1. Given the set H(Ξ∗), the sharp lower and upper bounds for the discretized
CCP p(X,W ∗d = j), j ∈M are given respectively by
Lj = inf
Ξ∈H(Ξ∗)
M∑
i=1
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)− [1− ςji(Ξ)]
ςji(Ξ)
· Ξij
and
Uj = sup
Ξ∈H(Ξ∗)
M∑
i=1
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)
ςji(Ξ)
· Ξij,
where
ςji(Ξ) =
ΞijPWj (Ξ)
PW ∗i
, i, j ∈M.
2.4.2 Payoff Primitives
After the partial identification of the discretized CCPs, we need to identify the function v(·).
By Proposition 2.4.1, Lj ≤ F|X,W ∗ [v(X,W ∗d = j)] = p(X,W ∗d = j) ≤ Uj . Therefore, another
function v′(·) ∈ V will be observationally equivalent to v(·) if the induced CCP by v′(·) will also
fall between these lower and upper bounds. Formally the set of functions indistinguishable from
v(·) is
Vo.e ≡ {v′ ∈ V : ∃F ′|X,W ∗ ∈ F s.t.F ′|X,W ∗ [v′(X,W ∗d = j)] < Lj orF ′|X,W ∗ [v′(X,W ∗d = j)] > Uj}.
(2.20)
We characterize the sufficient condition for identification of the function v(·) in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2.4.1. If for any v′(·) ∈ V with v′(·) 6= v(·) and any distribution function F ′|X,W ∗(·) ∈ F ,
Pr[Lj ≤ F ′|X,W ∗ [v′(X,W ∗d = j)] ≤ Uj] = 0, then Vo.e = {v(X,W ∗d = j)}.
If the sufficient condition in Lemma 2.4.1 is satisfied, v(X,W ∗d = j) will be point-identified,
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then the payoff primitives α(·) and β(·) can be separately identified by using a similar argument as
in Section 2.3.2.
2.5 Estimation
Based on the identification equation (2.6), we propose a semiparametric sieve maximum like-
lihood estimator for the unknown parameters. The density function fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗) will be
parametrized as fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗; θ0), where θ0 ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd+1 is a finite-dimensional parameter
vector and the subscript “0" means the true value of the parameter. We assume that θ is identified
if fY |X,W ∗(·) is identified so the parametrization does not include redundant degrees of freedom.
The unknown density functions fW |W ∗ and fW ∗|W ′ will be estimated by nonparametric method.
Specifically we will approximate fW |W ∗ and fW ∗|W ′ by truncated series and estimate all parame-
ters within a semiparametric maximum likelihood hood framework.
As in [43], we impose standard smoothness restrictions and assume that the unknown functions
fW |W ∗ and fW ∗|W ′ belongs to a Hölder space. For any d × 1 vector a = (a1, a2, · · · , ad)T of
nonnegative integers, let |a| = ∑dk=1 ak and for any u ∈ U ⊂ Rd, we denote the |a|-th derivative
of a function h : U 7→ R as
∇ah(u) = ∂
|a|
∂ua11 · · · ∂uadd
h(u).
For some ξ > 0, let ξ be the largest integer smaller than ξ and let ‖ · ‖E denote and Euclidean
norm. The Hölder space Λξ(U) of order ξ is a space of functions h : U 7→ R such that the first ξ
derivative is bounded and the ξ=th derivative is Hölder continuous with exponent ξ − ξ ∈ (0, 1],
i.e.,
max
|a|=ξ
|∇ah(u)−∇ah(u′)| ≤ const.(‖u− u′‖E)ξ−ξ
for all u, u′ ∈ U and some constant. The Hölder space becomes a Banach space when endowed
with the Hölder norm as follows:
‖h‖Λξ = sup
u∈U
|g(u)|+ max
|a|=ξ
sup
u6=u′
|∇ah(u)−∇ah(u′)|
(‖u− u′‖E)ξ−ξ
.
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The Hölder ball (with radius c) is defined as Λξc(U) ≡ {h ∈ Λξ(U) : ‖h‖Λξ ≤ c ≤ ∞}. It is
well known that power series, splines, Fourier series and wavelets all can approximate functions in
Λξc(U) well.4
ASSUMPTION 2.5.1. (i) fW |W ∗ ∈ Λξc(W ×W∗) with some ξ > 1 and
∫
W fW |W ∗(w|w∗)dw = 1
for all w∗ ∈ W∗; (ii) fW ∗|W ′ ∈ Λξc(W∗ ×W ′) with some ξ > 1 and
∫
W∗ fW ∗|W ′(w
∗|w′)dw∗ = 1
for all w′ ∈ W ′.
To simplify notations we use f1 and f2 to denote fW |W ∗ and fW ∗|W ′ , respectively. We assume
that the unknown functions f1 and f2 belongs to the sets F1 and F2 defined below:
F1 = {f1(·) : Assumptions 2.3.3, 2.3.5 and 2.5.1 (i) hold} ,
F2 = {f2(·) : Assumptions 2.3.3 and 2.5.1 (ii) hold} .
By Proposition 2.3.2 and Kullback-Leibler information criterion, the true value of parameters γ0 =
(θT0 , f1, f2)
T can be solved by
γ0 = argmax
γ=(θT ,f1,f2)T∈Γ
E
[
ln
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗; θ)f1(w|w∗)f2(w∗|w′)dw∗
]
,
where Γ = Θ × F1 × F2. Let {pknj (·), j = 1, 2, · · · } be a sequence of known basis functions
(power series, splines, Fourier series, etc.). To approximate f1 and f2, we use a tensor-product
linear sieve basis, denoted as pkn(·, ·) = (pkn1 (·, ·), pkn2 (·, ·), · · · , pknkn(·, ·))T . The integer kn is the
smoothing parameter, which is required to grow with n so that the approximation error decreases
to zero. To conduct sieve approximation we replace F1 and F2 by sieve spaces F1n and F2n where
F1n =
{
f1 : f1(w|w∗) = pkn(w,w∗)Tµ, ∀ µ s.t. Assumptions 2.3.3, 2.3.5 and 2.5.1 (i) hold
}
4Note that we assume the support of W , W ∗ and W ′ are bounded, in case of unbounded support we need to use
a weighted Hölder ball Λξ,ωc (U) with some weighting function ω(·) to facilitate the treatment of functions defined on
unbounded domains, see [44] for details.
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and
F2n =
{
f2 : f2(w
∗|w′) = pkn(w∗, w′)T ζ, ∀ ζ s.t. Assumptions 2.3.3 and 2.5.1 (ii) hold} .
Then we estimate γ0 by γˆ = (θˆT , fˆ1, fˆ2)T as
γˆ = argmax
γ∈Γn
1
n
n∑
i=1
ln
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(Yi|Xi, w∗; θ)f1(Wi|w∗)f2(w∗|W ′i )dw∗,
where Γn = Θ × F1n × F2n. In practice, this integration can be conveniently implemented by
different numerical techniques including Simpson’s rules, Gaussian quadrature and so forth.
We apply the result in [45] to establish consistency of the sieve estimator γˆ for γ0 under a norm
‖ · ‖s, which is defined as below:
‖γ‖s = ‖θ‖E + ‖f1‖∞ + ‖f2‖∞
for Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖E and sup norm ‖ · ‖∞.
In general, conditional onXc andG∗,Wi ⊥ Wj ifNi∩Nj = ∅, i.e., players i and j do not share
common friends according to the observed data5. To ensure the consistency of the sieve estimator,
the interdependence of {Wi}i∈N should disappear as n → ∞. If the social network has a “circle"
structure, as is illustrated in Figure 2.2 (b), {Wi}i∈N will be independent, conditioning on Xc and
G∗. However, assuming the observed network is a circle is too restrictive and will ignore many
interesting network structures. Let Ci ≡ {j ∈ N\{i} : Ni∩Nj 6= ∅} denote the set of players that
share common friends with i. If we can bound the number of players who share comm friends in
the large network, then it is easy to verify that {Wi}i∈N will have finite dependence. To formalize
this intuition, define C = ∪i∈NCi to be the set of players sharing common friends in the network.
We need to bound the cardinality of C: if there exists a m < ∞ such that C <≤ m, then it is
5Since Wi contains information about player i’s friends’ actions, and their actions are independent with each other
when conditioning on Xc and G∗, therefore if i and j share common friends, then those friends’ actions will enter
both Wi and Wj , making Wi and Wj dependent with each other.
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straightforward to verify that conditional on Xc and G∗, {Wi}i∈N will be m-dependent. Similar
logic also applies to {W ′i}i∈N . Therefore we impose the following assumption:
Figure 2.2: Illustration of Observed Network Structures
(a) Common friends (b) Circle
Remark. Figure 2.2 provides a graphic illustration of our notations. In Figure 2.2 (a), i and k are
friends with each other and they share a common friend j, therefore Ni ∩ Nk = {j}, Ci = {k},
Ck = {i}, Cj = ∅ and C = {i, k} in this 3-players network. In Figure 2.2 (b) i, j and k do not
share a common friend with each other and hence Ci = Cj = Ck = C = ∅.
ASSUMPTION 2.5.2. {Wi}ni=1 and {W ′i}ni=1 are m-dependent and identically distributed, condi-
tional on Xc and G∗.
By Assumption 2.5.2, the observed data {(Yi, Xi,Wi,W ′i )ni=1} is weakly dependent (m-dependent)
and identically distributed, conditional on Xc and G∗.
As in [2], we also define the projection of γ ∈ Γ onto the space Γn as
Πnγ ≡ argmax
γ=(θT ,f1,f2)T∈Γn
E
[
ln
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗; θ)f1(w|w∗)f2(w∗|w′)dw∗
]
and impose the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2.5.3. ‖Πnγ0 − γ0‖ = o(n−1/4) as kn →∞ and kn/n→ 0.
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Assumption 2.5.3 implies that the sieve can approximate the true value γ0 arbitrarily well and
guarantee that the number of terms in the sieve grows slower than than the sample size so that
the bias and variance of sieve approximation can be controlled. It can be satisfied by using many
commonly used sieve functions such as power series, splines and so forth.
ASSUMPTION 2.5.4. (i) Θ ⊂ Rd+1 is compact; (ii) θ0 ∈ int(Θ).
Assumption 2.5.4 (i) ensures that the parameter space Γ is compact under the pseudo norm
‖ · ‖s and is commonly imposed in the nonparametric and semiparametric econometrics literature,
see [46] for detailed discussion about this condition. Assumption 2.5.4 (ii) is standard and requires
θ0 to be an “interior" solution.
Define D = (y, x, w, w′) for y ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X , w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ and follow [2], we also
impose the following restrictions on the log-likelihood function:
ASSUMPTION 2.5.5. (i) E[(ln fYW |W ′,X(D, γ))2] is bounded; (ii) ln fYW |W ′,X(D, γ) is Hölder
continuous in γ.
Assumption 2.5.5 guarantees a Hölder continuity property for the log-likelihood function,
specifically it imposes an envelope condition on the derivative of the log-likelihood function and
will be used to characterize a stochastic equicontinuity condition in [47]. With previous assump-
tions, we establish the consistency of γˆ in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.5.1. Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.3.5 and 2.5.1-2.5.5, we have ‖γˆ − γ0‖s = op(1).
Theorem 2.5.1 provides the consistency result under the norm ‖·‖s. Nevertheless, it is relatively
difficult to derive the asymptotic normality and
√
n consistency result under ‖ · ‖s since it is too
strong to obtain a convergence rate faster than n−1/4. Following [43], we employ a weaker norm
‖ · ‖ to establish the asymptotic normality of θˆ.
Before introducing the norm ‖ · ‖, we first review the concept of pathwise derivative, consider
γ1 and γ2 ∈ Γ , and assume the existence of a continuous path {γ(τ) : τ ∈ [0, 1]} in Γ such that
γ(0) = γ1 and γ(1) = γ2. Also assume that Γ is convex at the true value γ0 in the sense that for
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any γ ∈ Γ and τ ∈ (0, 1), (1− τ)γ0 + τγ ∈ Γ . If ln fYW |W ′X(D, (1− τ)γ0 + τγ) is continuously
differentiable at τ = 0 for almost all D and any γ ∈ Γ , the first pathwise derivative of ln fYW |W ′X
at γ0 evaluated at the direction [γ − γ0] can be defined as
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[γ − γ0] ≡ d ln fYW |W
′X((1− τ)γ0 + τγ)
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
a.s. D.
We define the inner product 〈γ, γ〉 as
〈γ, γ〉 = E
[(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[γ]
)2]
with the induced Fisher norm ‖γ‖ defined as√〈γ, γ〉. Now we derive the asymptotic distribution
of θˆ. As before we must first introduce some notations. Let Γ = Rd+1 × F with F = F1 ×F2 −{
(fW |W ∗ , fW ∗|W ′)T
}
denote the closure of the linear span of Γ − {γ0} under the norm ‖ · ‖ and
define the Hilbert space (Γ , ‖ · ‖). Then we can write
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[γ − γ0] =d ln fYW |W
′X(D, γ0)
dθ
[θ − θ0] + d ln fYW |W
′X(D, γ0)
df1
[f1 − fW |W ∗ ]
+
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df2
[f2 − fW ∗|W ′ ].
For each component θj of θ, j = 1, 2, · · · , d+ 1, let m∗j ≡ (f ∗1j, f ∗2j)T ∈ F denote the solution to
min
mj∈F
E
{(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dθj
− d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df1
[f1j]− d ln fYW |W
′X(D, γ0)
df2
[f2j]
)2}
.
Define m∗ = (m∗1,m
∗
2, · · · ,m∗d+1),
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df
[m∗j ] =
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df1
[f ∗1j] +
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df2
[f ∗2j],
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df
[m∗] =
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df
[m∗1], · · · ,
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df
[m∗d+1]
)T
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and the column vector
Gm∗(D) =
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dθ
− d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
df
[m∗]. (2.21)
In order to show that θˆ has a multivariate normal distribution asymptotically, we instead can show
that λT θˆ has a normal distribution for all λ ∈ Rd+1. Following Ai & Chen (2003) for s(γ) = λT θ
with λ 6= 0, which is a linear functional on Γ , we have
sup
06=γ−γ0∈Γ
|s(γ)− s(γ0)|2
‖γ − γ0‖2 = λ
T
(
E{Gm∗(D)Gm∗(D)T}
)−1
λ.
Therefore, in order for the functional s(γ) to be bounded, E{Gm∗(D)Gm∗(D)T} has to be positive
definite. Then by Riesz representation theorem, there exists a representer γ∗ such that
s(γ)− s(γ0) = 〈γ∗, γ − γ0〉 for all γ ∈ Γ, (2.22)
where γ∗ = (γ∗θ , γ
∗
f ) ∈ Γ with γ∗θ = (E{Gm∗(D)Gm∗(D)T})−1λ and γ∗f = −m∗γ∗θ . (2.22) implies
that under suitable conditions, it is sufficient to find the asymptotic distribution of 〈γ∗, γˆ − γ0〉 to
obtain that of s(γˆ)− s(γ0) = λT (θˆ − θ0).
Define
N0n = {γ ∈ Γn : ‖γ − γ0‖s = o(1), ‖γ − γ0‖ = o(n−1/4)}
and define N0 the same way with Γn replaced by Γ . For γ ∈ Γn, let γ∗(γ, εn) = (1 − εn)γ +
εn(γ
∗+ γ0) with εn = o(n−1/2) be a local alternative value and denote Pnγ∗(γ, εn) by a projection
of γ∗(γ, εn) onto Γn. The following conditions are sufficient for the
√
n-normality of θˆ:
ASSUMPTION 2.5.6. (i) There exists a measurable function c(D) with E[c(D)4] < ∞ such that
| ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ)| ≤ c(D) for allD and γ ∈ Γn; (ii) ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ) ∈ Λξc(Y×W×W ′×X )
for some constant c > 0 with ξ > dD/2, for all γ ∈ Γn, where dD is the dimension of D. (iii) Γ
is convex in γ0 and fY |W ∗,X;θ is pathwise differentiable at θ0; (iv) There exists c1 and c2 > 0 such
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that c1KL(γ, γ0) ≤ ‖γ − γ0‖2s ≤ c2KL(γ, γ0) holds for all γ ∈ Γn with ‖γ − γ0‖s = o(1), where
KL(γ, γ0) ≡ E
[
ln
fYW |W ′X(D,γ0)
fYW |W ′X(D,γ)
]
is the Kullback-Leibler information.
Assumption 2.5.6 (i) and (ii) impose an envelope condition and a smoothness condition on the
log likelihood function. Condition (iii) ensures that the Fisher norm ‖ ·‖ is well defined. Condition
(iv) guarantees that the population criterion function can be approximated locally by ‖γ − γ0‖2.
Assumption 2.5.6 together with Assumption 2.5.3 ensure that under the weaker norm ‖ · ‖, the
sieve estimator will converge at the rate n−1/4, which is a prerequisite to derive the asymptotic
distribution of θˆ.
ASSUMPTION 2.5.7. (i) E{Gm∗(D)Gm∗(D)T} is bounded and positive-definite; (ii) There exists
a γ∗n = Pnγ
∗(γ, εn) ∈ Γn − {γ0} such that ‖γ∗n − γ∗‖ = o(n−1/4); (iii) For all γ ∈ N0n,
KL(γ, γ0) =
1
2
‖γ − γ0‖2(1 + o(1)).
Assumption 2.5.7 (i) implies that θ0 is locally identified. Condition (ii) requires that the Riesz
representer v∗ can be approximated well by the sieve space, which is necessary to ensure that
the bias of the sieve estimator is asymptotically negligible. Condition (iii) indicates that KL(·, ·)
is locally equivalent to ‖ · ‖2, which characterizes the local quadratic behavior of the criterion
difference, i.e., Condition B.2 in [47]. By checking conditions in Theorem 2 of [47], we show that
the estimator for the structural parameter θ0 is
√
n consistent and follows an asymptotic normal
distribution.
Theorem 2.5.2. Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.3.5 and 2.5.1-2.5.7,
√
n(θˆ − θ0) d−→ N(0, V ), where
V =
[
E{Gm∗(D1)Gm∗(D1)T}
]−1
+ 2
m∑
j=1
E
{[
E{Gm∗(D1)Gm∗(D1)T}
]−1
Gm∗(D1)Gm∗(Dj)
T
[
E{Gm∗(Dj)Gm∗(Dj)T}
]−1}
.
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2.6 Monte Carlo Simulations
This section illustrates the finite sample performance of the proposed estimator using simulated
data. Specifically we consider a simple binary game with linear payoff:
Ui1 = α0 + α1Xi + βWi(YN∗i , G
∗
i )− i
with
Wi(YN∗i , G
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈N∗i Yj∑
j 6=iG
∗
ij
representing the proportion of player i’s friends that will choose action 1. We assume that |X,W ∗ ∼
N(0, 1) so that the density f(Y ∗i |Xi,W ∗i ) will have the form
f(Y ∗i |Xi,W ∗i ) = Φ(α0 + α1Xi + βW ∗i )Y
∗
i [1− Φ(α0 + α1Xi + βW ∗i )]1−Y
∗
i ,
where Φ(·) is the CDF of standard normal random variable.
In the simulations, the payoff covariate Xi is randomly drawn from a standard normal distribu-
tion. Furthermore, we generate the latent random social network as follows: the whole sample is
divided into 20 equally sized subnetworks with each having n/20 players and those subnetworks
are placed on a line, indexed as 1, 2, · · · . For any two players i and j, i 6= j within the same sub-
network, the true network connections G∗ij ∈ {0, 1} is drawn independently from the probability
mass distribution (1 − 20
n
, 20
n
), specifically G∗ij = 1(ηg∗ > 1 − 20n ) for ηg∗ ∼ U(0, 1). Moreover,
G∗ii = 0 for all i ∈ N . To ensure the weak dependence of network data, we require that for players
in different subnetworks l andm, if |l−m| = 1,G∗ij = 1(ηg∗ > 1− 20n · 110); If |l−m| > 1,G∗ij = 0.
The instrumental variable G′ are generated as G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.2), where ηz ∼ U(0, 1)
for players within the same subnetwork and G′ij = G
∗
ij for players in different subnetworks. The
correlation between G∗ and G′ is captured by ηg∗ .
The distribution of the measurement error is specified in the matrix PGij |G∗ij with Pr(Gij =
k|G∗ij = k′) for k and k′ ∈ {0, 1} in each entry. The specification uses the constant misclassifica-
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tion probabilities for players in the same subnetwork as follows:
PGij |G∗ij =
Pr(Gij = 0|G∗ij = 0) Pr(Gij = 0|G∗ij = 1)
Pr(Gij = 1|G∗ij = 0) Pr(Gij = 1|G∗ij = 1)
 .
Note that the elements on the diagonal of PGij |G∗ij represent the probability of correct reporting. For
a given value of G∗ij , the value of Gij is generated according to PGij |G∗ij and another independent
random variable ηg ∼ U(0, 1) as Gij = 1(ηg > 1 − Pr(Gij = 1|G∗ij)) for players in the same
subnetwork and Gij = G∗ij for players in different subnetworks. The values of PGij |G∗ij will be
specified for the experiment. In the current experiment we choose
PGij |G∗ij =
0.2 0.8
0.8 0.2
 .
Simulation results under different specifications of PGij |G∗ij are provided in Appendix B. We have
performed several experiments with the number of players n = 1000. In each iteration of the
experiment, we first compute the semi-anonymously symmetric BNE by solving the fixed point of
the equilibrium mapping given the underlying parameter value α0 = 1, α1 = 1 and β = 1. With
the numerical solution in hand, we can simulate the equilibrium actions Y for each player.
Regrading estimation, we consider three maximum likelihood estimators: (i) the inconsistent
estimator obtained when we ignore measurement errors and treat G as the true network, (ii) the
infeasible estimator obtained using the latent true network graph G∗ and (iii) the proposed sieve
estimator using the IV G′. According to Assumption 2.3.5 the identification restriction imposed
for the sieve MLE is the zero mode assumption, i.e., M [f ] = argmaxx∈X f(x). The sieves of
unknown functions f1 and f2 are constructed through tensor product bases of truncated univariate
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trigonometric series. Since Wi,W ∗i and W
′
i ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N , we have
fW |W ∗(w|w∗) =
in∑
i=0
jn∑
j=0
µijqi(w − w∗)qj(w∗)
=
in∑
i=0
jn∑
j=0
[µ1ij cos(ipi)(w − w∗) + µ2ij sin(ipi)(w − w∗)] cos(jpi)w∗
and
fW ∗|W ′(w∗|w′) =
in∑
i=0
jn∑
j=0
ζijqi(w
∗ − w′)qj(w′)
=
in∑
i=0
jn∑
j=0
[ζ1ij cos(ipi)(w
∗ − w′) + ζ2ij sin(ipi)(w∗ − w′)] cos(jpi)w′,
where
qi(w − w∗) = (cos(ipi)(w − w∗), sin(ipi)(w − w∗))T and qj(w∗) = cos(jpi)w∗,
qi(w
∗ − w′) = (cos(ipi)(w∗ − w′), sin(ipi)(w∗ − w′))T and qj(w′) = cos(jpi)w′,
and µij = (µ1ij, µ2ij), ζij = (ζ1ij, ζ2ij). As in [2], it is fairly straightforward to show that the
restriction
∫
W f1(w|w∗)dw = 1 implies that µ100 = 12 and µ10j = 0 for all j = 0, 1, · · · , jn
and similarly
∫
W∗ f1(w
∗|w′)dw∗ = 1 implies ζ100 = 12 and ζ10j = 0 for all j = 0, 1, · · · , jn.
Furthermore, the zero mode restriction implies that
∑in
i=1
(−1)i
i
µ2ij = 0 and
∑in
i=1
(−1)i
i
ζ2ij = 0
for all j = 0, 1, · · · , jn. We will incorporate these restrictions when maximizing the sieve MLE
objective function.
The implementation of the sieve method requires appropriate selection of the smoothing pa-
rameter kn = (in + 1)(jn + 1). A formal selection method for kn and proof its asymptotic validity
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, since it is well known that the asymptotic distribution
semiparametric sieve estimators is identical in a wide range of smoothing parameter sequences,
following [2] and [48] we choose the smoothing parameter by locating a range of values where the
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estimates are not very sensitive to small variations in in and jn in simulations.
The simulation results are provided in Table 2.1. For each estimator, we report the mean, the
standard deviation (Std.dev), and the mean squared error (MSE) of the estimators averaged over
all 500 replications. The simulation results indicate that if we ignore the measurement errors and
naively conduct MLE, the estimated peer effects will be severely biased. On the other hand our
proposed Sieve MLE performs well in reducing the bias and MSE caused by the presence of mea-
surement errors for the parameter of interest β, which represents the peer effects. Furthermore, our
method can also reduce the bias and MSE in estimates of α0. We change the values of smoothing
parameters and the sieve estimates are not very sensitive those changes and hence suggests that the
selected smoothing parameters are valid. In Appendix B we provide additional simulation results.
Table 2.1: Simulation Results
Parameter(=True Value)
α0 = 1 α1 = 1 β = 1 (Peer Effects)
Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE
Ignoring meas. error 1.4023 1.1326 1.4420 0.9114 0.0744 0.0134 0.0560 1.3149 2.6166
Accurate data 1.0096 0.0890 0.0080 1.0144 0.0818 0.0069 1.0093 0.1363 0.0186
Sieve MLE 0.9824 0.2682 0.0721 0.9137 0.1097 0.0195 1.0862 0.5406 0.2991
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 2, jn = 3 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.4099 1.1298 1.4418 0.9092 0.0745 0.0138 0.0398 1.3119 2.6396
Accurate data 1.0078 0.0871 0.0076 1.0095 0.0857 0.0074 0.9983 0.1404 0.0197
Sieve MLE 1.0055 0.2581 0.0665 0.9063 0.0927 0.0174 1.0077 0.5464 0.2980
Smoothing parameters: in = 3, jn = 4 in f1; in = 3, jn = 4 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.3307 1.1168 1.3541 0.9056 0.0772 0.0149 0.1300 1.2997 2.4428
Accurate data 0.9991 0.0916 0.0084 1.0079 0.0837 0.0071 1.0112 0.1316 0.0174
Sieve MLE 0.9879 0.2552 0.0651 0.9104 0.1030 0.0186 1.0554 0.5576 0.3134
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 6, jn = 4 in f2.
n=1000, replication=500
2.7 Empirical Application
In this section, we use our proposed method to analyze the peer effects on youth alcohol drink-
ing behaviors. Recently, there is a growing body of empirical literature on studying the peer effects
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on adolescents behaviors, see e.g., [8], [10], [7], [38] and references therein. The data we used is
obtained from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health), which
is a database designed to investigate the relationship between the social environment and adoles-
cents’ behaviors. The Wave I data contains a nationally representative sample of more than 90,000
students in grades 7-12 from 80 high schools and 52 middles schools in the United States during
the 1994-1995 school year and the second wave surveyed almost 15,000 of the same students one
year after Wave I. In the data every student was asked to complete a questionnaire to provide in-
formation about his or her socioeconomic characteristics as well as school-related behaviors and
friendship network.6
A unique feature of the Add Health data is that it contains information about respondents’
social network information. In the survey questionnaire, each student is asked to provide his or
her friendship information by nominating at most five male and female best friends. However,
the restriction on the number of friends to be nominated can plausibly lead to measurement error
because students with more than 10 friends will not be able to provide information on all his or
her friendship network. [38] compare peer effects by using Wave I and Wave II network data and
find qualitatively similar peer effects, despite the fact that in the data friendship network tend to
change substantially between two waves. Based on this empirical finding, they cast doubt about
the accuracy of self-reported friendship links.
Our empirical strategy is to use the Wave II network data as the instrumental variable for the
Wave I network G. Given the fact that the Wave II data was surveyed after one year of Wave I,
it is convincing that the exclusion restrictions in Assumption 2.3.2 are satisfied. Following the
literature, the covariates we used include age, GPA, race information, gender and family income
with sample size n = 1, 528. The summary statistics for variables used in our empirical analysis
are presented in Table 2.2.
We use a similar specification of the payoff function and sieve basis functions as in the sim-
ulation and the smoothing parameter kn is also selected by finding a range of values where the
6See the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth) for a detailed description of surveys and
data.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (1,528 observations)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 0.4980 0.5002 0 1
Age 15.5157 1.5762 12 20
White 0.7251 0.4466 0 1
GPA 3.1291 0.5731 1.75 4
Income 53.1198 45.2244 0 900
Alcohol 0.4928 0.5001 0 1
The unit for income is in thousand dollars.
estimates are not very sensitive to small variations in in and jn. Our empirical results are presented
in Table 2.3. Note that we also report the results of MLE when ignoring measurement errors for
the purpose of comparison. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using 400 bootstrap
samples.
Table 2.3: Empirical Results
Variable MLE ignoring meas. error Sieve MLE
Female 0.0401 0.2662
(0.0675) (0.7418)
Age 0.1866*** 0.1004***
(0.0221) (0.0241)
White 0.2875*** 0.1093***
(0.0776) (0.0340)
GPA -0.4282*** -0.4920**
(0.0605) (0.2102)
Income 0.0013 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0040)
Constant -1.9648*** -1.3716*
(0.4092) (0.7162)
Peer Effects 0.5688*** 1.1357***
(0.1257) (0.2327)
Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using 400 bootstrap samples
Smoothing parameters: in = 5, jn = 3 in f1; in = 4, jn = 5 in f2.
* 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
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In Table 2.3, most of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 10% significance level. By
comparing the results in Columns 2 and 3, we find that when the measurement errors in network
data are ignored, the peer effects estimated using MLE are positive and statistically significant (i.e.,
0.5688 with a standard error 0.1257). The estimated peer effects ignoring measurement errors is
qualitatively similar to those empirical results in [7] and [8], who use Add Health data and the
NELS data to study school-based peer effects on youth behaviors. However, the estimated peer
effects are biased in the presence of measurement errors. Using the proposed sieve estimator, we
find consistent and much larger estimated peer effects (1.1357 with a standard error of 0.2304) on
youth alcohol drinking behaviors. This is equivalent to a 39.15% difference in the average partial
effect of actions from peer group. Hence our empirical results demonstrate that if the measurement
errors in network data are ignored, and then peer effects will be significantly underestimated.
The accuracy of the estimated peer effects can be crucial for policymakers who wish to estab-
lish some methods to control for teenagers’ smoking and alcohol drinking behaviors. For example
policymakers can impose additional sales taxes on cigarette and alcoholic beverage. Nevertheless,
in order to determine the optimal tax rates they need to know how sensitive will adolescent react
to the increases in tax, i.e., tax elasticities. As is demonstrated in [10], the smoking and alcohol
actions from peer group can have significant social multiplier effects on the tax elasticities. Con-
sequently, the effectiveness of tax policies depends upon whether we can estimate the peer effects
accurately.
2.8 Conclusion
We have developed an econometric framework to nonparametrically identify CCPs and peer
effects of a network game with incomplete information, allowing for the presence of measurement
error in network connections. In particular, we show that under the large game setting, the CCPs
are asymptotically equivalent to the ones that are conditional on players’ own characteristics and
a scalar valued function of their network structure. Hence the CCPs can be nonparametrically
identified by applying the method in [2]. Then the payoff primitives are proved to be identified up
to a monotone transformation. We also propose a semiparametric method to consistently estimate
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the peer effects. As an application of the proposed methods, we study the peer effects of adolescent
alcohol drinking behaviors and find that the peer effects will be significantly underestimated when
measurement are ignored.
It is interesting to see what we can do for the inference of peer effects without the availability of
an instrumental variable. From the analysis in Section 2.4 we know that the CCPs will no longer
be point-identified, instead we will obtain a sharp identification region for the CCPs. With the
partially identified CCPs, the peer effects may or may not be point-identified, depending on the
specific identification assumptions imposed in the model. The estimation method proposed in [3]
can be used to estimate the sharp bounds. Then peer effects can be estimated by exploring the
literature of moment inequality models. We leave this for future research.
Another important extension of the current methodology would be to apply it to the new but fast
growing area of network formation econometrics. Under the setup of network formation model,
we will have measurement error in outcome variables and a method dealing with the identification
of CCPs in this case will be required.
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3. NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF ADDITIVE SOCIAL
INTERACTION MODELS WITH HOMOPHILY
3.1 Introduction
Social interaction models study how economic agents interact with each other through their
decision making processes with respect to the socioeconomic activity. Recent empirical studies
have found evidence of interaction effects on crime ([49], employment ([50]), in-school achieve-
ments ([7]), adolescent behavior ([8]; [10]; [51]), among others. In the previous literature, social
interaction can be modeled as either a Manski type linear-in-mean regression model or a strategic
game played in a social network. These two approaches are widely used in studying social in-
teraction effects with continuous and discrete outcomes respectively, e.g., see [23], [26], [52] and
[27]. However, one potential problem associated with these studies is that they treat other agents
in a network equally important for a given economic agent and ignore a pervasive phenomenon in
social network: homophily, which is the principle that “similarity breeds connection" ([53]).
In this paper, we construct a social interaction model under the framework of simultaneous
move game with incomplete information and adopt the solution concept of Bayesian Nash Equi-
librium (BNE). In the game each player chooses an action from a finite set and the payoff function
consists of three parts: direct utility from the chosen action, strategic effect from other players’ ac-
tions and a stochastic component representing player’s private information. The three components
are assumed to be additively separable, similar payoff structure has been studied in [31].
One innovation in this paper is to make use of the homophily principle when measuring the
strategic effects of other player’s actions. In sociology, homophily is the principle that a contact
between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people. Therefore, intuitively
we would expect that for a particular player, the strategic effect from another player’s action will be
strong if they are similar to each other in terms of socioeconomic attribute. The similarity between
two players is represented by a social distance function, which measures the difference between
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two players’ socioeconomic characteristics, and we restrict the strategic effect to be decreasing
as the social distance between two players increases. Our specification of homophily effect is
motivated by the previous work of [54] and [55], who argue that agents close to each other in terms
of socioeconomic characteristics interact strongly while those who are socially distant have little
interactions. This specification makes our model different from previous literature, our method
can demonstrate how a social network connects each agent to the other and reflects the impact of
homophily network structure on agents’ social actions.
Motivated by the commonly adopted data structure in the social interaction literature, the iden-
tification and estimation strategies in this paper are developed under “a large game" setting, mean-
ing that the number of players in a network is fairly large. Identification and estimation in a large
game are difficult because of two reasons. First, such games will usually generate multiple equi-
libria, which leads to the incompleteness of econometric models ([33]). Second, players’ actions
are interdependent in a large social network, resulting in problems for identifying and estimating
player’s equilibrium probability of actions. We solve the first problem by employing a symmetric
equilibrium selection mechanism proposed in [36], which allows for the existence of multiple equi-
libria but requires those equilibria to be symmetric. The second problem is addressed by imposing
a conditional independence assumption, which requires players’ private information to be indepen-
dently and identically distributed conditional on all the public information and is commonly used
in the literature of incomplete information games.
The identification proceeds in two steps. The first step is to identify the equilibrium conditional
choice probabilities (CCPs), which is guaranteed by the symmetric equilibrium selection mecha-
nism and conditional independence assumption. The second step is to identify payoff primitives.
Specifically, we extend the method proposed in [9] to the context of game theoretical models in
order to identify the deterministic part of the payoff function as a whole. The key is to establish a
rank ordering property regarding CCPs, which means that actions with higher deterministic payoffs
are more likely to be chosen by players. Then by exploring the variation of CCPs and homophily
effects, direct utility and strategic effect can be identified separately.
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Based upon the identification methodology, we propose a computationally feasible two-step
method to nonparametrically estimate the model primitives and establish its consistency. As a re-
sult of the symmetric equilibrium selection mechanism, players with the same characteristics can
be treated as repeated observations of the same player. Therefore, in the first step we can estimate
the CCPs using a conventional kernel-type estimator. In the second step, we nonparametrically
estimate the parameters of interest by a smoothed version of the pairwise maximum score method
proposed in [56]. Furthermore, under a semiparametric setting, we show that the first-stage non-
parametric estimation has no impact on the asymptotic behavior of second-stage estimation under
mild conditions and derive the asymptotic distribution of smoothed pairwise maximum score esti-
mator.
In the empirical application, we apply our methods to study the peer effects on youth smoking
behavior using the data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
The Add Health is a longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in
grades 7-12 in the United States during the 1994-95 school year. It contains student’s social net-
work data, as well as their socioeconomic characteristics, which are indispensable for our analysis.
We treat each school in the dataset as an observation of a social network and apply the proposed
two-step method to estimate the peer effects on students’ smoking behavior using data from 7
schools, each of which has more than 800 observations. We find positive and statistically signif-
icant peer effects for all schools, which is similar to other empirical findings of peer effects on
youth smoking behavior using different datasets. See e.g., [10] and [11]. Our empirical finding
indicates that smoking behavior from a student’s schoolmates will make that student more likely
to consume cigarette. We also compare the empirical results with and without imposing the ho-
mophily effects, the comparison indicates that without considering the homophily effects, most of
the estimated peer effects become insignificant, which demonstrates the empirical importance of
including homophily effects in our model.
One of our main contributions in this paper is to employ a novel way to incorporate homophily
effect into a social interaction model. [57] study the social interaction model with homophily and
43
use the dependence of private information between players to represent the homophily effect. Here
we adopt a different approach by using the difference between players’ observed socioeconomic
characteristics to explicitly model the homophily effect of the social network, which we believe
is more appropriate under the context of incomplete information game because the private infor-
mation is unobserved between players and hence they can not use it to measure the “closeness"
between each other. Under our setting, the homophily effect can be easily calculated using data.
This paper also adds to the growing literature of identification and inference of discrete games
with incomplete information. Most of the previous discussions focus on “small-game” settings and
assume the observability of a large number of repetitions for the same game in order to identify
and estimate the models, see e.g., [58]; [40]; [40]; [59]). Instead, our identification and estimation
methods are based on one observation of a large game and thus are more suitable for the commonly
used data structure like the Add Health data in the social interaction literature. A similar paper that
considers the large game setting with incomplete information game is [57], but the objectives of
our paper and [57] are different since his work studies on social network formation while we fo-
cus on social interactions in a given network. Our approach treats the network formation process
as exogenously given, hence we can use the variation of homophily effect to help identify model
primitives. To the best of our knowledge, [51] is the only paper that considers both network for-
mation and social interactions in networks, but he imposes a Gumbel distribution assumption and
uses a MCMC algorithm to identify and estimate the model, which departs from the nonparametric
method proposed in this paper.
It is worth mentioning that our identification method is fully nonparametric while most of the
previous work in social interaction and incomplete information game adopts parametric or semi-
parametric method for identification. For example, [22] and [26] assume that the utility function
is linear, [23], [40] and [27] impose a parametric distributional assumption in order to identify the
model. Therefore, our results are more general and robust to misspecification of those parametric
assumptions and provide new insights into the identification methodology of this literature. [60]
also consider nonparametric identification of incomplete information games by using a “special
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regressor" that is independent of private information. In contrast we allow for the endogeneity of
all covariates and achieve point identification by imposing some mild assumptions on the payoff
function that can be supported by economic theory.
Last but not the least, our work contributes to the literature of nonparametric estimation by pro-
viding a two-step estimator and establishing its uniform consistency using the empirical process
methods developed by [61] and [62]. If, additionally the payoff function is of a parametric form,
we show that the first-step nonparametric estimator is asymptotically orthogonal to the second-
step smoothed pairwise maximum score estimation under mild restrictions and hence establish the
asymptotic normality for the pairwise smoothed maximum score estimator. Therefore, by provid-
ing a sufficient condition for asymptotic orthogonality under the context of smoothed maximum
score estimation, our work is also related to the literature of semiparametric M-estimation , see
e.g., [63], [64] and [65], but the difference between our work and previous literature is that be-
cause of the distribution-free setting and nonsmooth population objective function, our two-step
semiparametric estimation will converges at a rate slower than the usual
√
n rate, which makes it
more difficult to derive the rate of convergence and obtain the asymptotic distribution.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the setting and basic as-
sumptions of our model. Section 3.2 provides the identification method. Section 3.4 discusses the
estimation method and establishes the asymptotic behavior of our proposed estimator. Section 3.5
contains empirical analysis of peer effects on youth smoking behaviors. Section 3.6 concludes. All
proofs are provided in Appendix B.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Setting
We consider a incomplete information game played in a social network. There are n players
indexed by i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}. In this game, each player simultaneously choose a discrete
action Yi ∈ A ≡ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K}. Let Xi ∈ X ⊆ Rd and Zik ∈ Z ⊆ Rq be the vectors of
i’s payoff relevant state variables. Here Xi represents player i’s socioeconomic characteristics
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and Zik is a vector of observable attributes related to player i’s action k ∈ A, which may be
different for each player. For example, consider the example of college choice decision, A is the
set of colleges available for the student and Xi can be student i’s family income, age and so on,
while Zik will be college k’s tuition fee and distance to his home, which in general varies across
different students. Moreover, player i also observes a vector of choice-specific payoff shocks
i ≡ {i0, i1, . . . , ik} ∈ RK+1, which is private information.
Player i’s payoff from choosing an action k ∈ A is specified as
Uik(Y−i, Xi, X−i, Zik, i) = α(Xi, Zik) +
∑
j 6=i
β(Yj, Xi, Zik) · γ(Hij) + ik, (3.1)
where Y−i and X−i denotes the action profile and socioeconomic characteristics of all the players
except i, α(·) is a choice-specific function, and β(·) represents the strategic effects of the actions
of other player on his payoff. Because only the differences of choice-specific payoffs matter to
players, without loss of generality we normalize the payoff of action 0 to be 0. Hij is the distance
between Xi and Xj , i.e.
Hij ≡ d(Xi, Xj) (3.2)
for a standard distance function d(·). We useHij to measure the socioeconomic difference between
player i and player j. Based on the theory of homophily in social network, people are more likely
to associate and bond with similar others, so in our model γ(Hij) represents the homophily effect
of the social network, Formally, we impose the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 3.2.1. (Homophily) For all i, j ∈ N , γ(·) : R 7→ [0, 1] is monotonically decreasing
in Hij and
∑
j 6=i γ(Hij) = 1.
One example of such function is γ(Hij) = H−1ij /
∑
l∈N H
−1
il , which is also the functional form
we adopted in the empirical studies. Under Assumption 3.2.1, the second part of player i’s payoff
function can be viewed as a weighted average of the strategic effects of all other players in the
same game, where the weights correspond to the homophily effects between player i and other
players. This specification makes our model different from the commonly used “linear-in-mean"
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approach in the literature, which assumes that each player’s action will be affected by the average
behavior of all other players (see e.g. [22]; [26]). Under our setting, each player’s action will
be affected by a weighted average of other player’s actions, where the weight corresponds to the
socioeconomic difference between different players. Therefore, γ(·) can demonstrate how a social
network connects each agent and reflect the impact of homophily network structure on agents’
actions. In the previous example, it is not difficult to see that our specification of the interaction
structure include the “linear-in-mean" approach as a special case by setting Hij to be a constant
for all i and j.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
In this static incomplete information game, each player’s strategy is based on her prior beliefs
about the probability distribution of other player’s actions. Let Zi = (ZTi0, Z
T
i1, · · · , ZTiK)T , Si =
(XTi , Z
T
i )
T and S = (S1, S2, · · · , Sn) be all the public information associated with player i. Also
let θ = (α, β(0, ·, ·), β(1, ·, ·), . . . , β(K, ·, ·))T be the structural parameters of the game, following
the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept, player i’s equilibrium strategy, denoted
as Y ∗i , can be written as
Y ∗i (S, i; θ) = argmax
k∈A
E[Uik(Y−i, Xi, X−i, Zik, i)|S, i]
= argmax
k∈A
{
α(Xi, Zik) +
K∑
l=0
[
β(l, Xi, Zik)
∑
j 6=i
Pr(Y ∗j (S, j; θ) = l|S, i)γ(Hij)
]
+ ik
}
.
(3.3)
In order to characterize the BNE solution we impose the following assumption
ASSUMPTION 3.2.2. (Conditional Independence) Conditional on S, {ik}i∈N,k∈A is identically
and independently distributed with a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing distribution
function Fik|S(·).
Assumption 3.2.2 is commonly imposed in the literature on identification and estimation of
static games with incomplete information and social interaction models (see, e.g., [31], [40] and
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[27]). Under this conditional independence assumption, Pr(Y ∗j (S, j; θ) = l|S, i) = Pr(Y ∗j (S, j; θ) =
l|S) for j 6= i. Following the literature in incomplete information game, we let σik(S; θ) ≡
Pr(Y ∗i (S, i; θ) = k|S) be the equilibrium conditional choice probability of player i choosing
action k. To simplify notation, let
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) ≡ α(Xi, Zik) +
K∑
l=0
[
β(l, Xi, Zik)
∑
j 6=i
σjl(S; θ)γ(Hij)
]
. (3.4)
Then a BNE solution (given state S) can be characterized by
σik(S; θ) = Pr[(Vi(Xi, Zik, S) + ik > Vi(Xi, Zih, S) + ih)|S], ∀h ∈ A\{k}
= Pr[ih < (Vi(Xi, Zik, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S) + ik)|S], ∀h ∈ A\{k}
=
∫
∈R
[∏
h6=k
Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zik, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S))
]
fik|S()d, (3.5)
where fik|S(·) denotes the (conditional) density function of ik.
For any given (S; θ) and based on (3.5), we can define a mapping Γ(S;θ) : ∆→ ∆ such that
Γ(S;θ)({σik(S; θ)}i∈N,k∈A) ≡
(
Γ
(S;θ)
1 ({σik(S; θ)}i 6=1,k∈A), ...,Γ(S;θ)N ({σik(S; θ)}i 6=N,k∈A)
)T
with
Γ
(S;θ)
j ({σik(S; θ)}i 6=j,k∈A) = (σj0, ..., σjK)T
≡
(
Γ
(S;θ)
j0 ({σik(S; θ)}i 6=j,k∈A), ...,Γ(S;θ)jK ({σik(S; θ)}i 6=j,k∈A)
)T
,
where ∆ denotes a simplex of dimension n · (K + 1).
In general, this mapping may have multiple fixed points and hence multiple equilibria, among
which we just focus on those symmetric equilibria in this paper. To this end, we first define some
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permutation functions. Define piij : N → N as a permutation of the indices i and j of players.
Specifically, piij maps the index i to the index j, j to i, and i′ to itself for all i′ 6= i, j. Similarly,
define piXij as a function that permutes the ith and jth elements of anyX ≡ (X1, .., Xn)T ∈ X n; and
piZij as a function that permutes the ith and jth elements of any Z ≡ (Z1, .., Zn)T ∈ Zn(K+1). We
thus have the set of permutations Π ≡ {(piij, piXij , piZij) |i, j ∈ N} with the generic element written
as pi(·).
Definition 3.2.1. An equilibrium belief σ ∈ ∆ is symmetric if for any θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , k ∈ A and
pi ∈ Π, we have σik(S; θ) = σpi(i)k(pi(S); θ).
Here, symmetry means that, for any action k ∈ A, pairs of agents with the same attributes
choose this action with the same conditional probability. Even if such a symmetric equilibrium
exists, there might still be multiple equilibria for any given draw (S, ). We hence, as in [36],
need to define a selection mechanism. First, we introduce a sequence of auxiliary random vectors
{ξn|n ∈ N} with an arbitrary finite dimension such that (Sn, ξn) ⊥ n for all n ∈ N , in which Sn
and n represent the sequentialization of S and  using the number of players. In particular, we can
make sense of ξn as a public signal that players may use to coordinate on a particular equilibrium
1. Most importantly, we assume that ξn is payoff irrelevant and accordingly, define the equilibrium
selection mechanism as a measurable function ρn : (Sn, ξn; θ) → σn ∈ ∆SE(Sn; θ) ⊆ ∆, where
σn denotes the sequentialization of σ using the number of players and ∆SE(Sn; θ) is the set of
symmetric equilibria (SE). This mapping thus formalizes the way in which players coordinate on a
symmetric equilibrium, and also it does not rely on the privately informed vector i for all i ∈ N .
ASSUMPTION 3.2.3. (Equilibrium Selection) There exist sequences of equilibrium selection mech-
anisms {ρn|n ∈ N} and public signals {ξn|n ∈ N} such that for n sufficiently large, ∆SE(Sn; θ)
is nonempty, and also for any Y ≡ (Y 1, ..., Y i, ..., Y n)T with Y i ∈ A,
Pr(Y n = Y |Sn) =
∑
σn∈∆SE(Sn;θ)
Pr(ρn (S
n, ξn; θ) = σn|Sn)
n∏
i=1
σni
(
Y i|Sn
)
,
1The inclusion of ξn is to ensure that the selection mechanism is nondegenerate, see Leung (2015) for details.
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where Y n represents the sequentialization of Y ≡ (Y1, Y2, ..., Yn)T using the number of players.
Intuitively Assumption 3.2.3 means that given one observation of the game, only one symmetric
equilibrium is realized in the data. But we allow the symmetric equilibrium to be different across
different observations of the same game. To guarantee that ∆SE(Sn; θ) is nonempty, we need to
impose following assumptions about the exchangeability of players and the continuity of payoff
functions so that a symmetric BNE always exists,
ASSUMPTION 3.2.4. (Anonymity) For all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , k ∈ A and any realization ik ∈ R, pay-
offs Uik(·) are anonymous in the sense that, for any permutation pi ∈ Π, we have Uik (σ−i, S, ik) =
Upi(i)k
(
σ−pi(i), pi(S), pi(i)k
)
.
In a word, under anonymity, payoffs do not depend on the particular labels assigned to players
but only on their attributes and equilibrium beliefs, which is a natural assumption under the context
of large number of players in the game (See, e.g., [36] and [66]). Therefore, player labels in the
data set have no economic relevance. It also ensures that the equilibria are extensively robust in
the sense of [39] even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed.
ASSUMPTION 3.2.5. (Continuity) For all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , k ∈ A and any realization ik ∈ R,
payoffs Uik (σ−i, S, ik) are continuously differentiable in S.
Assumption 3.2.5 is a regularity condition to ensure that the mapping Γ(S;θ) has a fixed point.
Consequently, the existence of a symmetric BNE can be guaranteed by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2.1. Suppose Assumptions 3.2.2-3.2.5 hold. Then there exists a symmetric Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium.
3.3 Identification
In this section, we provide a nonparametric method to explore the identifiability of the structural
parameter θ in the sense similar to [67] and [9], i.e., different values of θ will result in different
choice probabilities. [67] and [9] discuss the nonparametric identification in the discrete choice
model with single agent, we modify Matzkin’s definition of identification and apply to the game
50
theoretic model in this paper. To be specific, the identification is implemented in two steps: The
first step is to identify players’ conditional choice probability of equilibrium actions and the second
step is to identify structural parameters of the payoff function.
As mentioned in the previous section, we focus on one market and the equilibrium selection
mechanism ensures that we only have one equilibrium give the one observation of that market, the
CCPs are therefore implicitly identified, hence θ will be identified as well if different values of θ
lead to different CCPs.
In the second step, we achieve identification by restricting the functional form of the payoff
function in the social network and proceed as follows: first we identify the composite function
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) for all i ∈ N and k ∈ A using a modification of the approach in [9], specifically we
impose the following restrictions on the payoff function of the game, which includes some mono-
tonicity and continuity assumptions. Next we identify the structural parameter θ by imposing a
rank condition similar to [40] and [27]. First, we introduce the following definition of identifica-
tion:
Definition 3.3.1. For all i ∈ N and k ∈ A, the function Vi(Xi, Zik, S) is identified in the set V if
for all V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) ∈ V such that V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) 6= Vi(Xi, Zik, S), there exist a set S˜ ∈ S with
positive Lebesgue measure and for all S ∈ S˜ we have σik(S;V ) 6= σik(S;V ′).
In this definition, σik(S;Vi) denotes the CCP of player i choosing action k with the emphasis
of dependence on V , where V = (V1, V2, · · · , Vn) for i ∈ N . Definition 3.3.1 simply means that
identification can be achieved if different values of Vi(Xi, Zik, S) lead to different CCPs. In order
to obtain the identification result, we impose the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 3.3.1. (Monotonic Transformation) For all Vi and V ′i ∈ V such that Vi 6= V ′i ,
there does not exist a strict increasing function m : Vi(·) → R such that V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) = m ◦
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) for all Zik ∈ Z .
By Assumption 3.3.1, no two functions in V are monotone transformations of each other, this
assumption is similar to Assumption 1.3 in [9] and guarantees that for an arbitrary player i, no two
51
payoff functions induce the same preorder on {Zi0, Zi1, · · · , ZiK}. [9] provides several sufficient
conditions for Assumption 3.3.1, which includes concavity or homogeneity of Vi(Xi, Zik, S), see
[9] for details.
ASSUMPTION 3.3.2. (Monotonicity) There exists l ∈ A such that Vi is strictly increasing with
respect to Zil for all Vi ∈ V and Zil has a everywhere positive Lebesgue density conditional on
S\{Zil}.
Assumption 3.3.2 is the key assumption for identification, it means that at least one element
of Zi has a continuous support and that vi(·) is strictly monotonic on that regressor conditional
on all the public information in the game. Note that this assumption is different from the “special
regressor" literature initiated by [68], which requires regressor be independent with the private
information. We believe that the requirement of monotonicity is less restrictive than independence
because it can be motivated by economic theory whereas the independence assumption is hard to
justify. The advantage of using the special regressor is that one can also identify the distribution
of the private information (see,e.g., [60]). However, this is not the goal of this paper because we
are interested in identifying the value of structural parameters. The key step of identification is to
establish the so-called rank ordering property, which is defined as follows
Definition 3.3.2. The rank ordering property is satisfied if for a given player i and for actions
k, l ∈ A,
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) > Vi(Xi, Zil, S)
if and only if
σik(S, Vi) > σil(S, Vi).
Definition 3.3.2 states that the equilibrium belief of player i’s action will be rank ordered by
the deterministic part of her payoff function. Actions with higher deterministic payoffs are more
likely to be chosen. This is a property that was first introduced in [18], we modify it under the
setup of our model. Then we have the following identification theorem:
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Proposition 3.3.1. Under Assumptions 3.2.1-3.3.2, Vi(Xi, Zik, S) is identified in the set V for all
i ∈ N and k ∈ A.
We briefly summarize the intuition of our identification strategy: the function Vi(·) is identified
by exploring the variation of choice specific characteristics Zik for k ∈ A, specifically suppose we
have two payoff function candidates Vi(·) and V ′i (·) such that Vi(·) 6= V ′i (·). By Assumption 3.3.1
and 3.3.2, there exists a choice l ∈ A and an nonempty set S˜ ⊂ S such that Vi(·) and V ′i (·) will
impose opposite preference ordering on options k and l for all S ∈ S˜, i.e., under payoff function
Vi(·) agent i may prefer k to l but under V ′i (·) she will prefer l to k and vice versa. Hence by
Assumption 3.2.2 and equilibrium condition (3.5), the rank ordering property holds. Then it must
be that either σik(S;V ) 6= σik(S;V ′) or σil(S;V ) 6= σil(S; vV ′). Therefore, by Definition 3.3.1
Vi(·) is identified.
Once Vi(·) is identified, the structural parameter θ can be identified accordingly by exploring
the variation of equilibrium beliefs. Specifically we need the variation of the product of equilibrium
belief and homophily effect to be sufficiently large, note that since the equilibrium beliefs will add
up to one, to avoid the multicollinearity problem we normalize βk(0, ·, ·) = 0 for all k ∈ A, i.e.,
the choice of action 0 by other players will have no impact on player i’s action. Then let φil(S) =∑
j 6=i σjl(S; θ) · γ(Hij) and φi(S) = (1, φi1(S), · · · , φiK(S))T , we introduce the following rank
condition.
ASSUMPTION 3.3.3. (Rank Condition) For sufficiently large game size n, the matrix E[φi(S) ·
φi(S)
T |Xi, Zik] is invertible, i.e.,
lim inf
n→∞
det(E[φi(S) · φi(S)T |Xi, Zik]) > 0. (3.6)
Assumption 3.3.3 is testable and similar to conditions imposed in [40] and [27]. Then by simple
algebra, we have
θk = {E[φi(S) · φi(S)T |Xi, Zik]}−1E[φi(S) · Vi(Xi, Zik, S−ik)|Xi, Zik]. (3.7)
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Consequently, we can identify θk for all k ∈ A.
Theorem 3.3.1. Under Assumptions 3.2.1-3.3.2, the structural functions θ are nonparametrically
identified in a large game.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the discussion above and is hence omitted.
To summarize, our identification strategy is to first identify the deterministic payoff function
for any given player using any given action over a positive Lebesgue measure set in the space of
public information. Then, by imposing some properties on the support of payoff functions as well
as equilibrium beliefs, a closed form expression for θ can be derived.
3.4 Estimation
In this section, we discuss the estimation of the structural parameters of our model in a nonpara-
metric setting. The proposed estimation method is a two-step method and the estimator is shown
to be uniformly consistent. Moreover, under a semiparametric setting, we prove that although the
first stage estimator converges at a speed lower than the parametric root-n rate, the convergence
speed of the second stage estimator will not be affected and is asymptotically normal. We believe
that the semiparametric inference can help the applied researchers to get a better understanding of
the estimation procedure and perform empirical analysis.
3.4.1 Nonparametric estimation
The estimation method consists of two steps: the first step is to nonparametrically estimate
the equilibrium beliefs {σik(S; θ)}i∈N, k∈A, which can be done using standard nonparametric tech-
nique. Since the identification of θ requires at least one element of S to be continuously distributed,
we use the kernel smoothing method and focus on the case that all components of S are continu-
ously distributed for the purpose of notational simplicity. As in [36], the symmetric equilibrium
selection mechanism alleviates the curse of dimensionality problem caused by the large dimension
of S and enable us to obtain the estimates with only a single network observation. The intuition is
that players with same characteristics can be treated as repeated observations of a single player.
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Because of the symmetric equilibrium selection mechanism, we can write σik(S; θ) as ρnk(Si, S−i),
where S−i = S\Si and ρnk(Si, S−i) is a function that is invariant to permutations of the compo-
nent Sj of S−i. In order to facilitate derivation of asymptotic result we consider the following
well-known class of smooth function2: for 0 < α < ∞, let CαM(X ) denote the class of func-
tions f : X 7→ R with ‖f‖α ≤ M , where for any m-dimensional vector of non-negative integers
k = (k1, k2, · · · , km):
‖f‖α ≡ max|k|≤α supx |D
kf(x)|+ max
|k|=α
sup
x,y
|Dkf(x)−Dkf(y)|
‖x− y‖α−α ,
where |k| ≡ ∑mi=1 ki, α denotes the greatest integer smaller than α and Dk is the differential
operator
Dk ≡ ∂
|k|
∂xk11 · · · ∂xkmm
.
We use {σˆik(S)}i∈N, k∈A to denote the nonparametric estimator for {σik(S; θ)}i∈N, k∈A and let
φˆil(S) =
∑
j∈N\{i} σˆjl(S; θ) · γ(Hij) and φˆi(S) = (1, φˆi1(S), · · · , φˆiK(S))T . The nonparametric
estimator will have the following form:
φˆik(S) =
∑
j 6=i
[∑n
j=1 1(Yj = k)K(
Sj−Si
h1
)∑n
j=1K(
Sj−Si
h1
)
]
γ(Hij), (3.8)
where K(·) is a high order product kernel function and h1 =
∏d+q(K+1)
r=1 h1r. The first stage
estimator can be viewed as a weighted U-statistics and under the following conditions, we show
that this first stage estimator is consistent.
Theorem 3.4.1. Under the following conditions, φˆik(S) − φik(S; θ) = op(1) for all i ∈ N and
k ∈ A.
(a) Assumptions 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 hold,
(b) ρnk(Si, S−i) ∈ CαM(S),
(c){Si : i ∈ N} is independent and identically distributed with a ν-times differentiable density
2See, e.g., Van der Vaart & Wellner (1996) Section 2.7.1.
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f(·) bounded away from zero,
(d)K(·) : Rd+q(K+1) 7→ [0, 1] is a νth order product kernel function,
(e)As n→∞, max1≤r≤d+q(K+1) h1r → 0 and nh1 →∞.
Since under current assumptions, we can not identify the distribution of the private information
, traditional estimation method like maximum likelihood estimation cannot be used. Instead in the
second step we can proceed to use a smoothed version of the pairwise maximum score method in
[56] to estimate the model, which does not require one to know the distribution of . Specifically
θˆ ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
Qn(θ, φˆ, h2) ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
1(Yi = k)
K∑
h6=k
G
(
φˆTi θk − φˆTi θh
h2
)
, (3.9)
where G(·) is a differentiable function on R satisfying the following conditions:
G1. |G(v)| < M for some finite M and all v ∈ R,
G2. lim
v→−∞
G(v) = 0 and lim
v→∞
G(v) = 1,
G3. G(·) is Lipschitz continuous, i.e., |G(v)−G(w)| ≤ c · |v − w| for all v, w ∈ R and some
c ≥ 0,
G4. G′(·) is a νth order kernel function (ν ≥ 2).
As pointed out in [12], here G(·) is analogous to a cumulative distribution function. Note that
h2 is the smoothing parameter satisfying limn→∞ h2 = 0 and limn→∞ n · h2 = ∞. To ensure
consistency of the estimator, we need to impose the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 3.4.1. The collection of the subgraphs of all θ ∈ Θ forms a Vapnik-Chervonenkis
(VC) class.
Assumption 3.4.1 is a fairly weak technical condition on the space of θ, intuitively it requires
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that the number of distinct subsets of the space of θ does not grow "too fast". For a formal definition
and examples of VC class, see [62]. Note that this assumption will be automatically satisfied if Θ
is finite dimensional, i.e., under the parametric setting.
ASSUMPTION 3.4.2. There exists a metric ‖ · ‖Θ such that (i) Θ is compact with respect to ‖ · ‖Θ;
(ii) θn ∈ Θ converges to θ uniformly if ‖θn − θ‖Θ → 0.
Assumption 3.4.2 is commonly assumed in the nonparametric and semiparametric economet-
rics literature (see, e.g.,[46], [22] and [43]). It restricts the space of structural parameters as well as
the choice of the norm ‖ · ‖Θ. As pointed out in [43], it will be satisfied if the infinite dimensional
space Θ consists of bounded and smooth functions. Therefore, without loss of generality we also
impose the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 3.4.3. There exists some C <∞ such that ‖θ‖Θ < C for all θ ∈ Θ.
Let
Q(θ, φ) ≡ E
[
K∑
k=1
1(Yi = k)
K∑
h6=k
1(φTi θk > φ
T
i θh)
]
be the probability limit of Qn(θ, φˆ, h2), in order to establish consistency we need to first introduce
several auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 3.4.1. Qn(θ, φˆ, h2) converges to Q(θ, φ) uniformly with probability approaching 1.
Lemma 3.4.2. Q(θ, φ) is continuous in θ ∈ Θ.
Lemma 3.4.3. Q(θ, φ) is uniquely maximized at θ∗ ∈ Θ, which is the true value of the parameters.
By using Lemma 3.4.1-3.4.3, the next theorem establishes the uniform consistency of our pro-
posed estimator:
Theorem 3.4.2. Given Assumption 3.2.1-3.3.3 and 3.4.1-3.4.3, θˆ is uniformly consistent for θ∗,
i.e., ‖θˆ − θ∗‖Θ = op(1).
Proof. By Lemma 3.4.1-3.4.3 and Assumption 3.4.2, conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 2.1 in [69] are
satisfied. Then immediately we can get ‖θˆ − θ∗‖Θ = op(1).
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3.4.2 Semiparametric estimation and inference
In this subsection, we restrict the space of the structural parameters to be finite dimensional
space Θ ⊆ Rd+q and discuss about the semiparametric estimation and inference of our model.
Specifically we focus on the case where K = 2 and let (Xi, Zik) ≡ Sik and αk(Xi, Zik) =
STikαk, βk(l, Xi, Zik) = βkl for all i ∈ N and k ∈ A. Without loss of generality we normalize the
payoff of action 0 to be 0, i.e., Ui0 = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that identification also requires βk0 = 0.
Then the objective function becomes
Qn(θ, φˆ1, h2) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[2 · 1(Yi = 1)− 1]G
(
STi1α1 + β1
∑
j 6=i σˆj1(S; θ)γ(Hij)
h2
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[2 · 1(Yi = 1)− 1]G
(
STi1α1 + β1φˆi1
h2
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[2 · 1(Yi = 1)− 1]G
(
wTi1θ
h2
)
, (3.10)
where w1 = (ST1 , φˆ1)
T and we can see that the objective function has a similar form as in [12]. In
order to characterize the asymptotic distribution of θˆ we first introduce some additional notations:
write S1 = (S11, S˜T1 )
T , w˜1 = (S˜T1 , φ1)
T , α1 = (α11, α˜T1 )
T , θ˜ = (α˜T1 , β
T
1 )
T and define
Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2) =
∂Qn(θ, φˆ1, h2)
∂θ˜
and
Hn(θ, φˆ1, h2) =
∂2Qn(θ, φˆ1, h2)
∂θ˜∂θ˜T
.
Let p(wT1 θ|S) denote the conditional density of wT1 θ on θ, which is positive everywhere with
respect to the Lebesgue measure by Assumption 3.4.4 (a) and (c) imposed below. For each positive
integer t, define
p(t)(wT1 θ|S) =
∂tp(wT1 θ|S)
∂(wT1 θ)
t
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whenever the derivative exists, and define p(0)(wT1 θ|S) = p(wT1 θ|S). Let F (·|wT1 θ, S) denote the
cumulative distribution function of  on wT1 θ and S. For each positive integer t, define
F (t)(−wT1 θ|wT1 θ, S) =
∂tF (−wT1 θ|wT1 θ, S)
∂(wT1 θ)
t
. (3.11)
For each ν ≥ 2, define the (d+ q)× 1 vector B and the (d+ q)× (d+ q) matrices D and H by
B = −2
∫ ∞
−∞
uνG′(u)du
ν∑
t=1
{
[t!(ν − t)!]−1E [F (t)(0|0, S)p(ν−t)(0|S)w˜]} ,
D =
∫ ∞
−∞
[G′(u)]2duE
[
w˜1w˜
T
1 p(0|S)
]
,
H = 2E
[
w˜1w˜
T
1 F
(1)(0|0, S)p(0|S)] .
It is worth mentioning that when deriving the asymptotic distribution of our semiparametric max-
imum score estimator, D and H have roles that are analogous to the outer product and Hessian
forms off the information matrix in maximum likelihood estimation. The regularity conditions
imposed for the asymptotic distribution result are stated as follows.
ASSUMPTION 3.4.4. (a) |α11| = 1 and θ˜ is contained in a compact subset Θ˜ of Rd+q; (b)
Median(|S) = 0; (c) the support of the distribution of w is not contained in any proper lin-
ear subspace of Rd+q+1; (d) Pr(Y = 1|S) ∈ (0, 1) for almost every S; (e) the distribution of
S11 conditional on S has everywhere positive density with respect to the Lebesgue measure; (f)
lim
n→∞
log n/(nh42) = 0; (g) the component of w˜1, w˜1w˜
T
1 and w˜1w˜
T
1 w˜1w˜
T
1 have finite third absolute
moments; (h) There exists some M < ∞ such that for all t ≤ ν, all wT1 θ in a neighborhood of
0 and almost every S, p(t)(wT1 θ|S) and F (t)(−wT1 θ|wT1 θ, S) exist and are continuous functions of
wT1 θ satisfying
∣∣p(t)(wT1 θ|S)∣∣ < M and ∣∣F (t)(−wT1 θ|wT1 θ, S)∣∣ < M . In addition, |p(wT1 θ|S)| < M
for all wT1 θ and almost every S. (i)The support of S˜1 is bounded;(j) H is negative definite; (k) θ˜ is
an interior point of Θ˜.
Assumption 3.4.4 (a)-(e) are used to establish the rank ordering property under a semi para-
metric setting and are standard in the maximum score estimation literature; see e.g., [19], [12] and
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[70]. Assumption 3.4.4 (f) is analogous to an under-smooth condition assumptions made in kernel
density estimation. Assumption 3.4.4 (g) and (h) ensure the existence of B, D and H as well as
the convergence of certain sequences of integrals when deriving the asymptotic normality, see [12]
for details. Assumption 3.4.4 (i)-(k) are standard in asymptotic distribution theory.
ASSUMPTION 3.4.5. If φˆ1 − φ1 = Op(rn), where rn is a nonstochastic positive real sequence,
then rn = o(1/
√
nh2).
Assumption 3.4.5 requires that the first-stage nonparametric estimator φˆ1 converges to φ1 faster
than 1/
√
nh2. Note that rn will be determined by the dimension of the continuous part of Si3 and
under the current semi-parametric setting, only one element of Si is required to be continuous.
Therefore, this assumption is not restrictive. Then by applying Taylor expansion and modify the
results in [12] we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4.3. Suppose Assumption 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 hold, let λ < ∞ be the limit of nh2ν+12 as
n→∞. Then √
nh2(θˆ − θ) d−→ N (−
√
λH−1B,H−1DH−1). (3.12)
Note that the proof does not trivially follow from [12] because under our setting {Yi}i∈N is not
an independent random sequence. But since {Yi}i∈N is independent conditional on S, our strategy
is to first derive the conditional asymptotic distribution of θˆ and then prove that unconditionally it
will converge to the same distribution.
To apply the result in Theorem 3.4.3, it is necessary to consistently estimate A, D and H . Let
θˆ be a consistent estimator of θ based on h2 ∝ n−1/(2ν+1) and by using Theorem 3 in Horowitz
3In the kernel estimation, the kernel function K(·) will be replaced by a indicator function for discrete variable
and the rate of convergence for the mixed variables is the same as the case involving only the subset of continuous
variables, see [71] for details.
60
(1992), we are able to get consistent estimators for A, D and H as
Bˆ = h∗−ν2 Bn(θˆ, φˆ1, h
∗
2), (3.13)
Dˆ =
h2
n
n∑
i=1
bn(θˆ, φˆ1, h2)bn(θˆ, φˆ1, h2)
T , (3.14)
Hˆ = Hn(θˆ, φˆ1, h2), (3.15)
where h∗2 ∝ n−δ/(2ν+1) for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and
bn(θˆ, φˆ1, h2) = [2 · 1(Yi = 1)− 1]
(
w˜i1
h2
)
G′
(
wTi1θ
h2
)
. (3.16)
It is generally acknowledged that θˆ can be quite sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth h2. In
practice, the optimal bandwidth is chosen to minimize the mean square error of θˆ and is selected by
a plug-in method proposed in [12]: Given ν, choose any h2 ∝ n−1/(2ν+1) and any h∗2 ∝ n−δ/(2ν+1)
for 0 < δ < 1. Obtain the smoothed maximum score estimator θˆ based on h2, and use θˆ and h∗2 to
compute Bˆ, Dˆ and Hˆ . Then compute optimal h2 by the following formula:
h2 =
[
Tr(Hˆ−1Hˆ−1Dˆ)
2nνBˆT Hˆ−1Hˆ−1Bˆ
] 1
2ν+1
, (3.17)
in which case
n
ν
2ν+1 (θˆ − θ) d−→ N
(
−
(
Tr(H−1H−1D)
2νBTH−1H−1B
) ν
2ν+1
H−1B,
(
Tr(H−1H−1D)
2νBTH−1H−1B
) −1
2ν+1
H−1DH−1
)
.
3.5 An empirical application
In this section, we use our proposed method to analyze the peer effects on youth smoking be-
havior. Recently, there is a growing body of empirical literature on studying the peer effects on
adolescents smoking behavior, see e.g., [8], [10], [11], [72] and reference therein. The data we
use is obtained from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), which
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is a database designed to study the relationship between the social environment and adolescents’
behavior. It contains a nationally representative sample of students in grades 7-12 from 80 high
schools and 52 middles schools in the United States during the 1994-1995 school year. In the data
every student is asked to complete a questionnaire to provide information about his or her socioe-
conomic characteristics as well as school-related behavior and friendship. The sample contains
information on 90,118 students.4
Our empirical strategy is to treat each school in Add Health dataset as a unique social network,
since different schools may achieve different (symmetric) equilibria, we estimate peer effects on
a school-by-school case. All the respondents in our empirical analysis are selected from 7 largest
schools with more than 800 observations each and the total number of observations n = 6, 342.
Following the literature, the covariates we choose include age, GPA, race information, gender and
family background (whether mother has gone to college and father has a job). The missing obser-
vation in mother’s education has been treated as 0. We also include a dummy variable indicating
whether the student has participated in any clubs, organizations or teams at school. The summary
statistics for variables used in our empirical analysis are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 15.629 1.267 10 19
Female 0.487 0.500 0 1
GPA 2.960 0.500 1 4
White 0.753 0.432 0 1
Hispanic 0.116 0.320 0 1
Black 0.113 0.316 0 1
Asian 0.043 0.203 0 1
Mother college 0.470 0.500 0 1
Father work 0.974 0.160 0 1
No club 0.150 0.357 0 1
Smoking 0.382 0.486 0 1
4See the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth) for a detailed description of surveys and
data.
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It is well known that nonparametric kernel method suffers from the “curse of dimensionality",
i.e., its convergence rate is inversely related to the dimension of covariates involved and this prob-
lem will be even worse if covariates are discrete. Therefore, in order to alleviate the dimensionality
problem, in the first stage estimation we use the smoothing method proposed in [73], the first stage
bandwidth h is selected by the cross-validation method. In the second stage estimation, the ob-
jective function we use is similar to (3.10) and the second stage bandwidth h2 is selected by the
plug-in method proposed in section 3.4.2. The smoothing functionG(·) is chosen to be the integral
of a fourth-order kernel for nonparametric density estimation ([74]). The homophily effects are
calculated by introducing a social distance function γ(·). Specifically let Hij = ‖Xi −Xj‖ be the
Euclidean norm and use
γ(Hij) =
H−1ij∑
l∈N H
−1
il
. (3.18)
It can be easily verified that (3.18) satisfies Assumption 3.2.1.
Our empirical results are presented in Table 3.2. The standard errors are computed using The-
orem 3.4.3. Because the consistency of our estimator requires normalizing the coefficient of one
continuous covariate to be 1 or -1, we normalize the coefficient of GPA to be equal to -1.5 For all
7 schools in the data, we find positive and statistically significant (at 1%) peer effects on smoking,
means that smoking behavior from a student’s schoolmates will make that student more likely to
consume cigarette. [8], [10] and [11] use different datasets and find similar results. From our re-
sults, it is clear that age has positive effect on student’s smoking behavior, which is consistent with
previous literature; see, e.g., [10] and [11]. Father working for pay is negatively correlated with
smoking, we believe this indicates (to some extent) that the student’s family income is negatively
correlated with smoking.
For the purpose of comparison, we also estimate the model without imposing homophily ef-
fects, i.e.,
γ(Hij) =
1
n− 1 . (3.19)
5 The negative effect of GPA on smoking has been confirmed by many previous literature, see, e.g., [52]
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results (with homophily effect)
Variable School 1 School 2 School 3 School 4 School 5 School 6 School 7
Age 2.588*** 0.050** 0.753*** 0.132* 2.352*** 0.149** 0.060**
(0.059) (0.024) (0.076) (0.071) (0.293) (0.067) (0.024)
Hispanic 4.866*** 0.068 -9.962*** -3.162* -6.354*** 2.034 -5.047***
(1.447) (0.177) (1.377) (1.696) (0.680) (0.563) (1.060)
White -32.393*** 0.338*** -7.383*** 8.738*** -37.598*** -2.326*** 1.801***
(1.756) (0.338) (1.268) (0.623) (4.916) (0.396) (0.363)
Black -14.921*** 0.341** -8.294*** -3.799** -36.904*** 12.274*** 1.171***
(0.927) (0.174) (1.269) (1.635) (4.813) (2.170) (0.333)
Asian -23.795*** -4.850*** 7.057*** -1.652 -10.406*** -2.185*** -80.839***
(1.815) (0.493) (1.890) (1.801) (1.238) (0.545) (0.000)
Female 46.440*** 3.064*** -14.499*** 1.166*** -39.350*** -2.696*** -4.569***
(0.000) (0.411) (1.417) (0.396) (5.165) (0.416) (0.935)
No club 2.528*** -0.039 4.797*** -4.142*** -0.214 -8.312*** -0.161
(0.679) (0.084) (0.226) (0.000) (0.283) (2.217) (0.099)
Mother college -7.638*** -2.681*** -0.142 -0.897** -5.961*** 15.000*** 2.220***
(1.130) (0.466) (0.128) (0.364) (0.796) (2.432) (0.287)
Father work -1.052** -5.268*** -10.296*** -10.914*** -36.661*** -19.213*** -4.116***
(0.458) (0.437) (1.413) (0.623) (4.815) (3.837) (0.946)
Peer effects 6.794*** 5.191*** 12.686*** 3.086*** 7.865*** 9.152*** 2.346***
(2.299) (0.649) (2.639) (0.609) (0.856) (2.231) (0.770)
Observations 805 818 846 973 855 1205 840
Standard errors in parentheses
* 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
The coefficient of GPA is normalized to -1.
Under this setup, our model incorporates a similar setting as a Manski-type linear-in-mean model.
The results are listed in Table 3.3, we can see that the estimated peer effects become statistically
insignificant among 6 of all 7 schools included. The only exception is school 5, from which we ob-
tain a negatively significant peer effects. This comparison demonstrates the empirical importance
of including homophily effects in our model.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a structural model of strategic social interactions that emphasizes the im-
pact of homophily effects on agents’ socioeconomic decisions. Our model assumes that individuals
are affected by all players within the same social network (global interaction), but the strength of
interactions decays as the social distance between players increases. Therefore, our specifica-
tion reflects the homophily principle in sociology: similarity breeds connection. By imposing a
symmetric equilibrium selection mechanism, we allow the existence of multiple equilibria across
different networks and establish nonparametric identification of the model and propose a compu-
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results (without homophily effect)
Variable School 1 School 2 School 3 School 4 School 5 School 6 School 7
Age 1.096*** -0.556*** 0.537** 0.516*** 2.645*** 0.007 0.063**
(0.033) (0.131) (0.245) (0.064) (0.113) (0.052) (0.030)
Hispanic -0.535 10.672 -10.690 -9.900*** -0.060 7.910 -6.611***
(1.200) (116.879) (31.353) (2.691) (2.407) (252.989) (0.520)
White -2.445*** 1.829*** -1.981*** -1.709** -0.117 -26.113 -0.093
(0.403) (0.242) (0.607) (0.712) (2.640) (84.410) (0.256)
Black -5.058*** 12.359 -2.905*** -9.702*** -0.363 8.670 -0.453*
(0.636) (117.076) (0.568) (2.691) (2.694) (253.076) (0.260)
Asian -6.630*** 9.642 -106.609*** -3.838*** -10.620*** -26.373 -4.751***
(0.451) (100.156) (0.000) (0.742) (2.048) (84.194) (0.301)
Female 1.497*** 8.646 -6.240*** 3.351*** -5.865*** -0.054 -6.090***
(0.000) (100.301) (1.145) (0.200) (2.065) (0.169) (0.317)
No club 0.128 11.356 3.940*** -4.936*** -0.112 -35.546 0.031
(0.336) (117.114) (0.351) (0.308) (0.467) (168.603) (0.116)
Mother college -11.433*** 0.182 -0.183 -47.370*** 0.355 1.865*** 5.066***
(1.708) (16.615) (0.160) (0.000) (0.429) (0.214) (0.272)
Father work -0.516** -1.230*** -2.666** -6.605** -5.848*** -0.778*** -4.879***
(0.217) (0.115) (1.061) (2.663) (1.934) (0.202) (0.196)
Peer effects 0.832 -33.619 -3.694 -0.510 -62.560*** -10.762 1.055
(3.757) (578.515) (6.041) (5.883) (8.815) (441.697) (0.871)
Observations 805 818 846 973 855 1205 840
Standard errors in parentheses
* 10% significant, ** 5% significant, *** 1% significant.
The coefficient of GPA is normalized to -1.
tationally feasible two-step estimation procedure that is robust to misspecification of distribution
assumption and the presence of multiple equilibria. In the empirical application we use our method
to analyze the peer effects on youth smoking using Add Health data and find strong empirical ev-
idence of peer effects among adolescents within the same school. Furthermore by comparing the
empirical results with and without specifying the homophily effect, our findings demonstrate the
empirical importance of including homophily effect in our model.
The work presented in this paper indicates various possible extensions for future research. An
example is to use different equilibrium solution concept that allows both local (i.e., the agent’s
neighbors or friends) and global interactions between players. [75] provides some examples of
such equilibria. Another, perhaps more interesting issue, is to identify the social distance function
γ(·). Here we assume that γ(·) is known, which can be viewed as a normalization assumption.
Developing methods to identify and estimate γ(·) in our framework will be of both theoretical and
empirical importance and calls for future work.
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4. A DATA-DRIVEN BANDWIDTH SELECTION METHOD FOR THE SMOOTHED
MAXIMUM SCORE ESTIMATOR
4.1 Introduction
A binary response model is a regression model in which the dependent variable is a binary
random variable. Binary response models are very useful for many economics and statistics appli-
cations.1 In this paper, we consider a linear binary response model with the following form
y = 1(xTβ + u ≥ 0), (4.1)
where y is a scalar dependent variable, 1(·) is the indicator function, x is a q×1 vector of explana-
tory variables, u is an unobserved random variable, and β is a q × 1 vector of parameters to be
estimated using the observed data {yi, xTi }ni=1.
In this model, we do not impose parametric assumptions on the distribution of u. Therefore, β
cannot be estimated by maximum likelihood method that has been widely used for probit and logit
models. If u and x are independent of each other, various semiparametric methods (e.g., [14], [15],
[16] and [17]) can be used to obtain a consistent estimator of β. The maximum score estimator
(MS) of [18, 19] allows for the dependence of the distribution of u on x in an unknown and general
way (heteroskedasticity of an unknown form). Specifically, the maximum score estimator βˆMS can
be obtained by
βˆMS = argmax
β∈Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(2yi − 1)1(xTi β ≥ 0), (4.2)
where Θ is the parameter space. However, since the objective function is discontinuous, the con-
vergence rate of the maximum score estimator is n−1/3, and its limiting distribution is non-standard
([20]). [12] develops a smoothed version of Manski’s maximum score estimator, which is asymp-
totically normal and has a faster convergence rate. The convergence rate could approach n−1/2,
1See [13] for a review of econometric applications of binary response models.
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depending on the strength of certain smoothness conditions.
The idea of Horowitz’s smoothed maximum score estimator (SMS) is analogous to the nonpara-
metric estimation of cumulative distribution function (CDF), and involves replacing the indicator
function by a continuously differentiable function in the objective function of the maximum score
estimation. The continuously differentiable function retains the essential features of an indicator
function. Specifically,
βˆSMS = argmax
β∈Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(2yi − 1)G
(
xTi β
hn
)
, (4.3)
where hn is the smoothing parameter (bandwidth) that converges to zero as n → ∞, and G(v) is
a continuous function satisfying |G(v)| < M , for v ∈ R and some M < ∞, limv→−∞G(v) = 0,
and limv→∞G(v) = 1. The identification of β (up to scale) requires that at least one component
of x to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure conditional on the remain-
ing components ([19]). We arrange x so that x1 satisfies this condition. Under some technical
conditions in [12], βˆSMS can be shown to be uniformly consistent and asymptotically normal.
It is generally acknowledged that kernel smoothing method can be very sensitive to the se-
lection of bandwidth. Different bandwidths can lead to completely different results. In terms of
bandwidth selection, [12] proposes a method that is analogous to the plug-in method in kernel den-
sity estimation. The method requires initial “pilot" values of hn to compute the SMS estimator βˆ,
and then uses this estimator to obtain the optimal bandwidth. This method has the disadvantage of
not being fully data-driven, since the estimated optimal bandwidth depends on the initial selection
of hn.
In this paper, we propose an alternative method to obtain the bandwidth. Unlike the conven-
tional plug-in method, we choose the bandwidth by minimizing a cross-validated criterion func-
tion. It is completely data-driven and does not require the selection of the initial bandwidth.
This essay is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss existing bandwidth selection
procedures and introduce our proposed method. In Section 4.3 we use simulations to examine the
67
finite sample performance of our proposed method. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Bandwidth Selection Procedures
In this section, we first discuss the bandwidth selection method in [12], and then introduce our
bandwidth selection procedure.
Based on Section 2 in [12], the optimal bandwidth selection requires two “pilot" bandwidths,
h = c1n
−1/(2s+1) and h∗ = c2n−δ/(2s+1), where c1, c2 and δ are some constants, with c1 ∈ (0,∞),
c2 ∈ (0,∞), and δ ∈ (0, 1), and s is the order of the kernel function G′(·). To obtain the opti-
mal bandwidth, one needs to manually select the values of c1, c2 and δ. Nevertheless in practice
there is little guidance on how to choose the three constants c1, c2 and δ. Different values of these
constants may result in completely different estimates of β. Furthermore, as shown in the simu-
lation studies of [12, 74], the empirical levels of t test based on first-order asymptotics are highly
sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. Therefore, inappropriate choices of c1, c2 and δ may lead
to a large gap between the empirical and nominal levels of hypothesis test, and hence invalidate
the inference results. The alternative bandwidth selection method we propose in this paper avoids
these problems.
Our bandwidth selection method is motivated by the cross-validation method in [76], who
propose a bandwidth selection method in univariate CDF estimation by minimizing the following
cross-validation function:
CV (hn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫ {
1(xi < x)− Fˆ−i(x)
}2
dx, (4.4)
where
Fˆ−i(x) =
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
G
(
x− xj
hn
)
is the leave-one-out nonparametric estimator for the univariate CDF, F (x). Based on (4.4), we
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propose to select hn for the SMS estimator by minimizing the following criterion function2:
CVSMS(hn; β) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
(2yi − 1)1
(
xTi β ≥ 0
)− 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(2yj − 1)G
(
xTj β
hn
)}2
. (4.5)
Note that (4.5) is analogous to (4.4) by setting x = 0, replacing the indicator function and Fˆ−i(x)
in (4.4) with (2yi − 1)1
(
xTi β ≥ 0
)
and the “leave-one-out" SMS objective function, respectively.
One problem with minimizing (4.5) is that β is unknown. We can obtain an initial value of β by
the MS estimation in (4.2). Therefore, our bandwidth selection method is a two-step procedure:
• Step 1: Obtain the initial value of β by
βˆMS = argmax
β∈Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(2yi − 1)1(xTi β ≥ 0).
Note that β can only be identified up to scale. It is convenient to impose the normalization
that |β1| = 1, where β1 denotes the coefficient of xi1;
• Step 2: Obtain the estimated bandwidth h˜n by
h˜n = argmin
hn
CVSMS(hn; βˆMS).
This two-step procedure does not require us to manually select the values of c1, c2 and δ. It is thus
completely data-driven. Note that since the convergence rate of βˆMS is slower than βˆSMS , the finite
sample performance of our proposed method can be improved by iterating the procedures above.
The iteration is as follows.
• Step 3: Obtain a new value of β by
βˆSMS = argmax
β∈Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(2yi − 1)G
(
xTi β
h˜n
)
,
2For using the cross-validation methods to select smoothing parameters in general conditional distribution function
and conditional mean function estimations, see [73] and [77].
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where h˜n is the bandwidth obtained in Step 2. Same normalization restriction as in Step 1
should also be applied in this step;
• Step 4: Obtain the estimated bandwidth ĥn by
ĥn = argmin
hn
CVSMS(hn; βˆSMS);
• Step 5: Repeat Steps 3 and 4, with h˜n = ĥn, until ĥn converges. The convergence criterion
in practice could be |ĥn− ĥn,−1| < , where ĥn,−1 is the ĥn in the previous iteration, and  is
a small positive constant.
4.3 Monte Carlo Simulations
This section describes Monte Carlo investigation of the finite sample performance of our pro-
posed method. Each Monte Carlo experiment is concerned with estimating the scalar parameter β
in the model
y = 1(x1 + βx2 + u ≥ 0),
where the true value of β is −1, x1 ∼ N(0, 1), and x2 ∼ N(1, 1). We consider two different
distributions for u. One is the uniform distribution with median of 0 and variance of 1, the other is
the Student’s t distribution with 3 degrees of freedom normalized to have variance of 1. Note that
the coefficient of x1 has been normalized to 1 for the purpose of identification. We use the CDF of
standard normal distribution as the smoothing function G(·).
The Monte Carlo experiments are conducted under three different scenarios. The first one is
to use the plug-in method proposed in Section 2 of [12] to select the smoothing parameter hn.
For the manually selected constants, c1, c2 and δ, we use the following values: c1 = 1, c2 = 1
and δ = 0.2. The second one is to use the cross-validation method proposed in this paper. The
convergence criterion is |ĥn − ĥn,−1| < 10−3. For the purpose of comparison, we also include the
(non-smoothed) maximum score estimator βˆMS in our experiments. The sample sizes we consider
are n = 500, 1000, and 1500. The number of replications is 1000. We compare the performance
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of the three methods in terms of mean squared errors (MSE), which is defined as
1
m
m∑
j=1
(βˆj − β)2,
where m is the number of replications, and βˆj is the estimate of β in j-th experiment.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the simulation results for Student’s t distribution and uniform distri-
bution, respectively. In each table, the first column shows the sample sizes, and the second to fourth
column correspond to the three methods in our experiments, i.e., cross-validation, non-smoothed,
and plug-in, respectively. The upper block reports the mean of the MSEs, while the lower block
reports the median of the MSEs. We see that in all of the cases, our cross-validation method
performs the best, while non-smoothed method performs the worst. In the comparison between
cross-validation method and plug-in method, we find that the MSEs of cross-validation method
are about 10% less than those of plug-in method. These results indicate that our data-driven cross-
validation method not only overcomes the disadvantages of plug-in method, but also improves the
performance in estimation.
Table 4.1: MSE for Student’s t Distribution
Method CV Non-smoothed Plug-In
Mean
n = 500 0.0284 0.0350 0.0299
n = 1000 0.0146 0.0185 0.0158
n = 1500 0.0117 0.0142 0.0128
Median
n = 500 0.0110 0.0144 0.0132
n = 1000 0.0056 0.0072 0.0064
n = 1500 0.0049 0.0064 0.0056
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Table 4.2: MSE for Uniform Distribution
Method CV Non-smoothed Plug-In
Mean
n = 500 0.0890 0.0951 0.0910
n = 1000 0.0489 0.0574 0.0529
n = 1500 0.0426 0.0504 0.0464
Median
n = 500 0.0182 0.0240 0.0210
n = 1000 0.0121 0.0144 0.0144
n = 1500 0.0090 0.0110 0.0100
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new method of selecting smoothing parameters in the smoothed
maximum score estimator. We select bandwidth by minimizing a cross-validated criterion function.
It does not require the selection of initial values for bandwidth, and is hence completely data-
driven. Simulation results show that our proposed method performs better than existing methods.
Future extensions of this paper include deriving the asymptotic properties of the cross-validation
method, and the application to the bandwidth selection of partially linear binary response models
as in [78].
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The first essay develops an econometric framework to nonparametrically identify CCPs and
peer effects of a network game with incomplete information, allowing for the presence of measure-
ment error in network connections. In particular, we show that under the large game setting, the
CCPs are asymptotically equivalent to the ones that are conditional on players’ own characteristics
and a scalar valued function of their network structure. Hence the CCPs can be nonparametrically
identified by applying the method in [2]. Then the payoff primitives are proved to be identified up
to a monotone transformation. We also propose a semiparametric method to consistently estimate
the peer effects. As an application of the proposed methods, we study the peer effects of adolescent
alcohol drinking behaviors and find that the peer effects will be significantly underestimated when
measurement are ignored.
In the second essay, we construct a structural model of strategic social interactions that empha-
sizes the impact of homophily effects on agents’ socioeconomic decisions. Our model assumes
that individuals are affected by all players within the same social network (global interaction), but
the strength of interactions decays as the social distance between players increases. Therefore,
our specification reflects the homophily principle in sociology: similarity breeds connection. By
imposing a symmetric equilibrium selection mechanism, we allow the existence of multiple equi-
libria across different networks and establish nonparametric identification of the model and pro-
pose a computationally feasible two-step estimation procedure that is robust to misspecification
of distribution assumption and the presence of multiple equilibria. In the empirical application
we use our method to analyze the peer effects on youth smoking using Add Health data and find
strong empirical evidence of peer effects among adolescents within the same school. Furthermore
by comparing the empirical results with and without specifying the homophily effect, our findings
demonstrate the empirical importance of including homophily effect in our model.
In the third essay, we propose a new method of selecting smoothing parameters in the smoothed
maximum score estimator. We select bandwidth by minimizing a cross-validated criterion function.
73
It does not require the selection of initial values for bandwidth, and is hence completely data-
driven. Simulation results show that our proposed method performs better than existing methods.
Specifically, in the comparison between cross-validation method and plug-in method, we find that
the MSEs of cross-validation method are about 10% less than those of plug-in method. These
results indicate that our data-driven cross-validation method not only overcomes the disadvantages
of plug-in method, but also improves the performance in estimation.
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APPENDIX A
IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF PEER EFFECTS IN MIS-MEASURED SOCIAL
NETWORKS
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1
By the law of iterated expectation, we know E[W ∗i − E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)] = 0. Therefore in order
to show that W ∗i − E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗) = op(1), we need to show that
E[W ∗i − E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)]2 = o(1). (A.1)
Since
E[W ∗i − E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)]2 = E
[∑
j∈N∗i Yj
|N∗i |
−
∑
j∈N∗i E(Yj|X
c, G∗)
|N∗i |
]2
= E
 1
|N∗i |
∑
j∈N∗i
(Yj − E(Yj|Xc, G∗))
2
=
∑
j∈N∗i
E
[
1
|N∗i |
(Yj − E(Yj|Xc, G∗))
]2
+
∑
j∈N∗i
∑
k 6=j,k∈N∗i
E
{
1
|N∗i |
[Yj − E(Yj|Xc, G∗)] [Yk − E(Yk|Xc, G∗)]
}
≡ A1 + A2.
Since Yj is binary, A1 = O(1/|N∗i |) = o(1) by Assumption 2.2.2. By law of iterated expectation
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and conditional independence of {Yi}i∈N , we have
A2 =
∑
j∈N∗i
∑
k 6=j,k∈N∗i
E
{
1
|N∗i |
E{[Yj − E(Yj|Xc, G∗)] [Yk − E(Yk|Xc, G∗)] |Xc, G∗}
}
=
∑
j∈N∗i
∑
k 6=j,k∈N∗i
E
{
1
|N∗i |
E [Yj − E(Yj|Xc, G∗)|Xc, G∗]E [Yk − E(Yk|Xc, G∗)|Xc, G∗]
}
= 0.
Therefore E[W ∗i − E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)]2 = o(1) and the lemma is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Let’s consider the correspondence Γ : [0, 1]n 7→ [0, 1]n with each coordinate-function compo-
nent given by Definition 2.2.1. It follows from Heine-Borel Theorem and Tychonoff Theorem that
[0, 1]n is a compact space for sufficiently large n. It is obvious that [0, 1]n is nonempty and convex.
Note from Definition 2.2.1 that
pi(X
c, G∗) = Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]|Xc, G∗}
= Pr
i ≤ α(Xi) +
∑
yN∗
i
∈{0,1}|Ni|
W (yN∗i , G
∗
i )β(Xi)Pr(YN∗i = yN∗i X
c, G∗)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗

= Pr
{
i ≤ α(Xi) +
∑
yN∗
i
∈{0,1}|Ni| [W (yN∗i , G
∗
i )β(Xi)Pr(YN∗i = yN∗i |Xc, G∗) + 0 · Pr(YN/N∗i = yN/N∗i |Xc, G∗)]
∣∣∣Xc, G∗},
where YN/N∗i denotes the equilibrium actions of all players other than those connected with i and
yN/N∗i denotes the realized values for YN/N∗i . Note from equation (2.3) that both Pr(YN∗i =
yN∗i |Xc, G∗) and Pr(YN/N∗i = yN/N∗i |Xc, G∗) are continuous functions with respect to pj(·) for
∀j ∈ N , we thus get that each coordinate function pi(Xc, G∗) of the correspondence Γ is a con-
tinuous function of pj(·) for ∀j ∈ N . As a result, Γ per se is continuous. Since it is obvious that
[0, 1]n is a compact Hausdorff space, we get by applying the Closed-Graph Theorem that Γ has
a closed-graph and hence is said to be sequentially upper hemicontinuous. Given that [0, 1]n is
compact, Γ is also compact-valued upper hemicontinuous.
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We now show that the correspondence Γ is also convex-valued. For this purpose, we consider
two alternative Bayesian strategies p′i(X
c, G∗) ∈ [0, 1] and p′′i (Xc, G∗) ∈ [0, 1] for any given agent
i ∈ N . By definition, for any given best responses p−i(·) of the other players, we have
p′i(X
c, G∗)Ui1(p−i(·)) + (1− p′i(Xc, G∗))Ui0(p−i(·)) ≥ pi(·)Ui1(p−i(·)) + (1− pi(·))Ui0(p−i(·))
and
p′′i (X
c, G∗)Ui1(p−i(·)) + (1− p′′i (Xc, G∗))Ui0(p−i(·)) ≥ pi(·)Ui1(p−i(·)) + (1− pi(·))Ui0(p−i(·))
for ∀pi(·) ∈ [0, 1]. Since we have Ui0(p−i(·)) = 0 for any p−i(·), we thus have
p′i(X
c, G∗)Ui1(p−i(·)) ≥ pi(·)Ui1(p−i(·)),
p′′i (X
c, G∗)Ui1(p−i(·)) ≥ pi(·)Ui1(p−i(·)),
therefore, for any coefficient λ ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
[λp′i(X
c, G∗) + (1− λ)p′′i (Xc, G∗)]Ui1(p−i(·)) ≥ pi(·)Ui1(p−i(·))
for any p−i(·) ∈ [0, 1]n−1. Thus we have shown that Γ is also convex-valued.
For each individual, the maximization problem is written as
max
pi∈[0,1]
{0, piUi1(p−i)} ,
for any p−i(·) ∈ [0, 1]n−1 of the remaining players. Given the linear property of expected utility
and the compactness of domain [0, 1], it follows from Weierstrass Theorem that Γ is a nonempty-
valued correspondence. Therefore, an application of the Kakutani Fixed-point Theorem shows that
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium always exists.
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Finally, noting that ifXi = Xj , then it is straightforward that α(Xi) = α(Xj), β(Xi) = β(Xj).
By Lemma 2.2.1, W ∗i = W
∗
j implies that E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗) − E(W ∗j |Xc, G∗) = op(1). In conse-
quence, it follows from Assumption 2.2.1 that these two players actually face the same decision
problem in the game for sufficiently large n, therefore their equilibrium strategies must be the
same. The proof is therefore complete.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Let Υ denote the support of i. Then for all i ∈ N , we have
|pi(Xc, G∗)− pi(Xi,W ∗i )|
=|Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]|Xc, G∗} − Pr{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i |Xi,W ∗i }|
=
∣∣∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]}f|Xc,G∗(i|Xc, G∗)di −
∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }f|X,W ∗(i|Xi,W ∗i )di
∣∣
=
∣∣∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]}f(i)di −
∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }f|W ∗(i|W ∗i )di
∣∣
=
∣∣∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]}f(i)di −
∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }[f(i)− f(i) + f|W ∗(i|W ∗i )]di
∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫
Υ
[1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]} − 1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }]f(i)di
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∫
Υ
1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }(f(i)− f|W ∗(i|W ∗i ))di
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
Υ
|[1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗]} − 1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }]| dF(i)
+
∫
Υ
∣∣1{i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }(f(i)− f|W ∗(i|W ∗))∣∣ di
≡B1 +B2,
where the second equality is by the definition of conditional expectation, the third equality is
because i is independent with Xc and G∗, the first inequality is by triangular inequality and the
second inequality is by the fact that |E(A)| ≤ E|A|. We now prove that both B1 and B2 are op(1).
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Since the maximum value of |1(·)− 1(·)| is 1, we have
B1 ≤
∫
Υ
1{α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗] ≥ i ≥ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }dF(i)
+
∫
Υ
1{α(Xi) + β(Xi)E[W ∗i |Xc, G∗] ≤ i ≤ α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i }dF(i)
≡C1 + C2.
Since C1 and C2 are similar, without loss of generality it suffices to show that C1 is op(1). By mean
value theorem,
C1 = F[α(Xi) + β(Xi)E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)]− F(α(Xi) + β(Xi)W ∗i )
= f(η)[α(Xi) + β(Xi)E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)− α(Xi)− β(Xi)W ∗i ]
= f(η)[β(Xi)E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)− β(Xi)W ∗i ]
= f(η)[β(Xi)(E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)−W ∗i )],
where η ∈ [β(Xi)W ∗i , β(Xi)E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)]. Since by Lemma 2.2.1 and Assumption 2.2.2,
β(Xi)(E(W ∗i |Xc, G∗)−W ∗i ) = op(1), we know C1 = op(1) and hence B1 = op(1). Also note that
by Lemma 2.2.1, the dependence between W ∗i and i disappears as n→∞, we have
f(i)− f|W ∗(i|W ∗) = op(1).
Therefore by dominated convergence theorem, B2 = op(1) and the desired result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
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By the definition of conditional densities and Assumption 2.3.2,
fYW |X,W ′(y, w|x,w′) =
∫
W∗
fYWW ∗|W ′,X(y, w, w∗|w′, x)dw∗
=
∫
W∗
fY |XWW ∗W ′(y|x,w,w∗, w′)fWW ∗|XW ′(w,w∗|x,w′)dw∗
=
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗)fWW ∗|XW ′(w,w∗|x,w′)dw∗
=
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗)fW |W ∗XW ′(w|w∗, x, w′)fW ∗|XW ′(w∗|x,w′)dw∗
=
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y|x,w∗)fW |W ∗(w|w∗)fW ∗|W ′(w∗|w′)dw∗.
This establishes (2.6), and then we can follow the proof of Theorem 1 in [2] to show the uniqueness
of the solution.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
If v and v′ are observationally equivalent, there exists F|X,W ∗ and F ′|X,W ∗ in F such that for
all (X,W ∗) ∈ X × W∗, F|X,W ∗ [v(X,W ∗)] = F ′|X,W ∗ [v′(X,W ∗)]. Since F ′|X,W ∗ is strictly
increasing, v′(X,W ∗) = (F ′|X,W ∗)
−1 ◦ F|X,W ∗ [v(X,W ∗)]. Let g = (F ′|X,W ∗)−1 ◦ F|X,W ∗ , and
then g is strictly increasing.
On the other hand, suppose that v′ = g◦v for some strictly increasing function g. Let F ′|X,W ∗ =
F|X,W ∗ ◦ g−1. Then for all X ∈ X and W ∗ ∈ W∗, F|X,W ∗ [v(X,W ∗)] = F ′|X,W ∗ [v′(X,W ∗)].
Hence v and v′ are observationally equivalent. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
By Bayes theorem,
P(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i) =
P(Wd = i|X,W ∗d = j)P(W ∗d = j|X)
P(Wd = i|X) .
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Therefore, the identification region of P(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i) can be characterized as
H[P(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i)] =
{
ΞijPWdj (Ξ)
PW ∗di
, Ξ ∈ H(Ξ∗)
}
, i, j ∈M, (A.2)
where PWj (Ξ) is the jth element of the matrix on the left hand side of (2.19). Then by (2.18)
and following [79], for any Ξ ∈ H(Ξ∗), the sharp identification region for Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd =
i,W ∗d = j) is given by
H(Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j)) = Ψp ∩
{
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)− ψ[1− ςji(Ξ)]
ςji(Ξ)
, ψ ∈ Ψp
}
, (A.3)
where Ψp denotes the space of all probability distributions on the measurable space (Y , Ω) and
ςji(Ξ) ∈ H[P(W ∗d = j|X,Wd = i)]. Based on (A.3) and without any other restrictions on
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j), the sharp bounds of Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i,W ∗d = j) can be
characterized as the smallest and largest values in the identification region, which are respectively,
L1(Ξ) =
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)− [1− ςji(Ξ)]
ςji(Ξ)
and
U1(Ξ) =
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)
ςji(Ξ)
.
Hence by the law of total probability, for a given value of Ξ ∈ H(Ξ∗), the smallest and largest
values in the identification region of p(X,W ∗d = j) are
L2(Ξ) =
M∑
i=1
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)− [1− ςji(Ξ)]
ςji(Ξ)
· Ξij (A.4)
and
U2(Ξ) =
M∑
i=1
Pr(Y = 1|X,Wd = i)
ςji(Ξ)
· Ξij (A.5)
respectively. The sharp bounds of the discretized CCP p(X,W ∗d = j), j ∈ M can be character-
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ized accordingly.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1
The proof proceeds by checking conditions of Theorem 4.1 in [45]. Following the proof of
Lemma 2 in [2], we only need to verify the pointwise convergence of 1
n
∑n
i=1Qi(γ) to E[Qi(γ)]
for all γ ∈ Γn, where
Qi(γ) ≡ ln
∫
W∗
fY |X,W ∗(y∗i |xi, w∗; θ)f1(wi|w∗)f2(w∗|w′i)dw∗
By LIE,
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))
]
= E
{
E
[(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))
)∣∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗
]}
= 0.
Furthermore we have
Var
{[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))
]∣∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗
}
=
1
n2
n∑
j=1
E
{
[Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))]2
∣∣Xc, G∗}
+
2
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
E {[Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))][Qj(γ)− E(Qj(γ))]|Xc, G∗}
≡ D1 +D2.
By Assumption 2.5.5 and following a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.2.1, we know
D1 = O
(
1
n
)
= o(1).
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Furthermore by Assumption 2.5.2,
D2 ≤ 2m
(n− 1) maxj 6=i,j∈N E {[Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))][Qj(γ)− E(Qj(γ))]|X
c, G∗}
= o(1).
Then by law of total variance and dominated convergence theorem,
Var
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Qi(γ)− E(Qi(γ))
]
= o(1).
Therefore, we can conclude that 1
n
∑n
i=1Qi(γ) − E(Qi(γ)) = op(1). By Lemma 2 in [2], all the
conditions in Theorem 4.1 of [45] are satisfied, hence we know
‖γˆ − γ0‖s = op(1).
Proof of Theorem 2.5.2
We prove this theorem by checking conditions of Theorem 2 in [47]. Following the proof of
Theorem 3 in [2], Conditions B.1-B.4 are verified and we only need to verify Condition B.5, i.e.,
√
nµn
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
)
d−→ N(0, σ2v∗), (A.6)
where µn(g) ≡ n−1
∑∞
i=1[g(γ,Di)− Eg(γ,Di)] denotes the empirical measure induced by g. We
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have
√
nµn
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
)
=
√
nµn
{
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]− E
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗)
+ E
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗)}
=
√
nµn
{
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]− E
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗)}
+
√
nµn
{
E
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗)}
≡√nHn1 +
√
nHn2.
We first show that Hn1 = op(1), which follows a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem
2.5.1. Specifically, by law of iterated expectation,
E(Hn1) = 0, (A.7)
and by law of total variance, we have
Var(Hn1) = E [Var(Hn1|Xc, G∗)] .
By a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1,
Var (Hn1|Xc, G∗)
= Var
{
µn
{
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]− E
(
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗)}∣∣∣∣Xc, G∗}
=O
(
1
n
)
.
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Hence by dominated convergence theorem,
Var(Hn1) = o(1). (A.8)
(A.7) and (A.8) together implies that
Hn1 = op(1). (A.9)
By applying a classical finite-dimensional CLT for strong mixing process, we have
Hn2
d−→ N(0, σ2v∗), (A.10)
where
σ2v∗ = Var
{
d ln fYW |W ′X(D1, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
}
+ 2
m∑
j=1
Cov
{
d ln fYW |W ′X(D1, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n],
d ln fYW |W ′X(Dj, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n]
}
.
Following the results in [2],
d ln fYW |W ′X(D, γ0)
dγ
[v∗n] = Gm∗(D)(E{Gm∗(D)Gm∗(D)T})−1λ, (A.11)
Consequently,
√
n(θˆ − θ0) d−→ N(0, V ) (A.12)
where
V =
[
E{Gm∗(D1)Gm∗(D1)T}
]−1
+ 2
m∑
j=1
E
{[
E{Gm∗(D1)Gm∗(D1)T}
]−1
Gm∗(D1)Gm∗(Dj)
T
[
E{Gm∗(Dj)Gm∗(Dj)T}
]−1}
.
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A.2 Additional Simulation Results
In this appendix, we provide additional simulation results, specifically we change the sample
size n, the DGP for the IVG′, and the matrix PGij |G∗ij to examine the performance of our estimator.
In Table A.1 and A.2, we change the sample size n to 500 and 2000 respectively, and it is not
surprising to see that our method still works very well in terms of correcting the bias and reducing
the MSE of the estimated peer effects caused by measurement errors. In Tables A.3-A.5 the IV G′
is generated as G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.2), and we increase the probability of correct reporting
to 0.8, specifically the matrix PGij |G∗ij is we used here is
PGij |G∗ij =
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
 .
We can see that the bias of α0 is relatively small if we ignore the presence of measurement errors.
However, the bias in β is still fairly large and the Sieve MLE can reduce the bias and MSE in this
case. The results are robust to different values of the smoothing parameters.
Table A.1: Simulation Results (n = 500)
Parameter(=True Value)
α0 = 1 α1 = 1 β = 1
Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE
Ignoring meas. error 1.4380 1.1374 1.4829 0.9139 0.1020 0.0178 0.0144 1.3068 2.6756
Accurate data 1.0022 0.1316 0.0173 1.0209 0.1156 0.0138 1.0378 0.1940 0.0390
Sieve MLE 1.0040 0.3106 0.0963 0.9177 0.1274 0.0230 1.0297 0.6577 0.4326
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 2, jn = 3 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.3981 1.1156 1.4006 0.9155 0.1026 0.0177 0.0611 1.2827 2.5237
Accurate data 1.0047 0.1316 0.0173 1.0220 0.1155 0.0138 1.0330 0.1927 0.0381
Sieve MLE 0.9963 0.3095 0.0956 0.9114 0.1230 0.0230 1.0300 0.6590 0.4344
Smoothing parameters: in = 3, jn = 4 in f1; in = 3, jn = 4 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.4020 1.1357 1.4489 0.9171 0.1021 0.0173 0.0547 1.3060 2.5957
Accurate data 1.0042 0.1302 0.0169 1.0238 0.1149 0.0137 1.0324 0.1903 0.0372
Sieve MLE 0.9847 0.3267 0.1068 0.9183 0.1398 0.0262 1.0546 0.6680 0.4483
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 6, jn = 4 in f2.
Notes: Simulation results for G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.2) and P(Gij = k|G∗ij = k) = 0.2.
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Table A.2: Simulation Results (n = 2000)
Parameter(=True Value)
α0 = 1 α1 = 1 β = 1
Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE
Ignoring meas. error 1.3964 1.2575 1.7352 0.9046 0.0534 0.0120 0.0564 1.4609 3.0203
Accurate data 1.0040 0.0659 0.0044 1.0069 0.0576 0.0034 1.0063 0.0936 0.088
Sieve MLE 0.9974 0.2121 0.0449 0.9042 0.0761 0.0150 1.0444 0.4512 0.2052
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 2, jn = 3 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.3648 1.2651 1.7304 0.9053 0.0538 0.0119 0.0961 1.4687 2.9697
Accurate data 1.0060 0.0658 0.0044 1.0075 0.0576 0.0034 1.0061 0.0926 0.0086
Sieve MLE 0.9994 0.2374 0.0563 0.9088 0.1044 0.0192 1.0603 0.4655 0.2199
Smoothing parameters: in = 3, jn = 4 in f1; in = 3, jn = 4 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.3679 1.2584 1.7158 0.9044 0.0538 0.0120 0.0906 1.4633 2.9639
Accurate data 1.0052 0.0661 0.0044 1.0066 0.0578 0.0034 1.0051 0.0928 0.0086
Sieve MLE 1.0126 0.2133 0.0455 0.9070 0.0935 0.0174 1.0247 0.4594 0.2112
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 6, jn = 4 in f2.
Notes: Simulation results for G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.2) and P(Gij = k|G∗ij = k) = 0.2.
Table A.3: Simulation Results (n = 500)
Parameter(=True Value)
α0 = 1 α1 = 1 β = 1
Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE
Ignoring meas. error 1.0835 0.4254 0.1876 0.9164 0.1030 0.0176 0.4300 0.4847 0.5594
Accurate data 1.0041 0.1329 0.0177 1.0219 0.1149 0.0137 1.0350 0.1898 0.0372
Sieve MLE 1.0348 0.3597 0.1303 0.9105 0.2037 0.0494 0.8536 0.6288 0.4160
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 2, jn = 3 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.0854 0.4268 0.1891 0.9151 0.1016 0.0175 0.4257 0.4894 0.5689
Accurate data 1.0031 0.1298 0.0168 1.0207 0.1158 0.0138 1.0363 0.1918 0.0380
Sieve MLE 1.0503 0.3536 0.1273 0.9067 0.1770 0.0400 0.8477 0.6212 0.4084
Smoothing parameters: in = 3, jn = 4 in f1; in = 3, jn = 4 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.0952 0.4308 0.1942 0.9186 0.1015 0.0169 0.4162 0.4933 0.5837
Accurate data 1.0061 0.1294 0.0168 1.0232 0.1149 0.0137 1.0303 0.1918 0.0376
Sieve MLE 1.0376 0.3840 0.1486 0.9201 0.1892 0.0421 0.8610 0.6389 0.4266
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 6, jn = 4 in f2.
Notes: Simulation results for G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.5) and P(Gij = k|G∗ij = k) = 0.8.
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Table A.4: Simulation Results (n = 1000)
Parameter(=True Value)
α0 = 1 α1 = 1 β = 1
Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE
Ignoring meas. error 1.0552 0.4811 0.2341 0.9036 0.0779 0.0153 0.4519 0.5536 0.6062
Accurate data 1.0013 0.0937 0.0088 1.0037 0.0848 0.0072 1.0087 0.1366 0.0187
Sieve MLE 1.0226 0.2668 0.0715 0.9136 0.1223 0.0224 0.9750 0.5470 0.2993
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 2, jn = 3 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.0546 0.4735 0.2267 0.9063 0.0797 0.0151 0.4553 0.5430 0.5909
Accurate data 1.0027 0.0934 0.0087 1.0076 0.0870 0.0076 1.0115 0.1369 0.0188
Sieve MLE 1.0363 0.2664 0.0721 0.9048 0.1378 0.0280 0.9375 0.5611 0.3181
Smoothing parameters: in = 3, jn = 4 in f1; in = 3, jn = 4 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.0497 0.4716 0.2244 0.9059 0.0772 0.0148 0.4585 0.5471 0.5919
Accurate data 1.0002 0.0917 0.0084 1.0062 0.0846 0.0072 1.0103 0.1327 0.0177
Sieve MLE 1.0214 0.2698 0.0731 0.9016 0.1166 0.0233 0.9558 0.5595 0.3144
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 6, jn = 4 in f2.
Notes: Simulation results for G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.5) and P(Gij = k|G∗ij = k) = 0.8.
Table A.5: Simulation Results (n = 2000)
Parameter(=True Value)
α0 = 1 α1 = 1 β = 1
Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE Mean Std.dev MSE
Ignoring meas. error 1.0154 0.5111 0.2609 0.9054 0.0545 0.0119 0.5033 0.5900 0.5941
Accurate data 1.0070 0.0655 0.0043 1.0062 0.0598 0.0036 1.0027 0.0932 0.0087
Sieve MLE 0.9950 0.2093 0.0437 0.9051 0.0707 0.0140 1.0484 0.4610 0.2144
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 2, jn = 3 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.0204 0.5122 0.2623 0.9043 0.0542 0.0121 0.4965 0.5905 0.6015
Accurate data 1.0055 0.0657 0.0043 1.0051 0.0597 0.0036 1.0034 0.0958 0.0092
Sieve MLE 1.0213 0.2067 0.0431 0.9077 0.0960 0.0177 0.9890 0.4652 0.2161
Smoothing parameters: in = 3, jn = 4 in f1; in = 3, jn = 4 in f2.
Ignoring meas. error 1.0071 0.5088 0.2584 0.9045 0.0535 0.0120 0.5110 0.5882 0.5844
Accurate data 1.0035 0.0654 0.0043 1.0062 0.0578 0.0034 1.0069 0.0940 0.0089
Sieve MLE 1.0071 0.2272 0.0516 0.9112 0.0963 0.0171 1.0328 0.4708 0.2223
Smoothing parameters: in = 2, jn = 3 in f1; in = 6, jn = 4 in f2.
Notes: Simulation results for G′ij = 1(0.6ηg∗ + 0.4ηz > 0.5) and P(Gij = k|G∗ij = k) = 0.8.
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APPENDIX B
NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF ADDITIVE SOCIAL
INTERACTION MODELS WITH HOMOPHILY
B.1 Equilibrium and Identification
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1: This proof mainly relies on an application of Schauder Fixed Point
Theorem and Arzelà-Ascoli Theorem. We use the same approach developed by [36] in proving
Theorem 1 and we shall complete it in 5 steps.
Step 1. Let ∆ be the space of continuously differentiable functions that are matrix-valued with
codomain being the set of n × (K + 1) matrices whose entries lie in [0, 1]. Endow ∆ with the
norm ‖f‖ ≡ sup
S∈S
|f(S)|, in which S ⊆ Rn[d+q(K+1)] is a compact Hausdorff space, so that ∆ is a
subset of the Banach space C (S, ‖·‖). Pick Σ as the subset consisting of such functions satisfy-
ing properties: (1) They are symmetric everywhere on S; (2) They are everywhere continuously
differentiable; (3) They are equicontinuous; (4) They have columns that have a sum of one.
Step 2. It’s obvious that for any σ, σ′ ∈ Σ and χ ∈ [0, 1], χσ(S) + (1− χ)σ′(S) still meet the
above (1)-(4) properties. Hence, we have χσ(S)+(1−χ)σ′(S) ∈ Σ, which confirms the convexity
of Σ.
Step 3. For any k ∈ A, let Uik (σ−i, S, ik) be the payoff function at the true parameter θ. To
emphasize the dependence of Γ on S, we w.o.l.g. rewrite Γ(S;θ)(σ) defined above as Γ(θ)(σ, S), for
any σ ∈ Σ. By making use of Assumption 3.2.4, we are led to
Γ
(θ)
pi(i)k(σ, pi(S))
= Pr
(
Upi(i)k
(
σ−pi(i), pi(S), pi(i)k
)
> Upi(i)h
(
σ−pi(i), pi(S), pi(i)h
)
,∀ h ∈ A, h 6= k|S, σ)
= Pr (Uik (σ−i, S, ik) > Uih (σ−i, S, ih) ,∀ h ∈ A, h 6= k|S, σ)
= Γ
(θ)
ik (σ, S).
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Hence, we can claim that Γ(θ)ik (·, S) maps symmetric functions to symmetric functions. Also, notice
from (5) that
Γ
(θ)
ik (σ, S) =
∫
∈R
[∏
h6=k
Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zik, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S))
]
fik|S()d, ∀i, k,
using Assumption 3.2.2 and 3.2.5 assures that Γ(θ)(σ, S) is continuous in S and σ and also pre-
serves equicontinuity. Also, by using the definition of Γ(θ)(σ, S), it is straightforward to show that
the columns have a sum of one.
Step 4. We show that Γ(θ)(Σ, S) is a subset of a compact space. And we just need to show
that Σ is compact. Noting that S is compact, Σ is uniformly bounded, and Σ is equicontinuous by
our construction, we apply the Arzelà-Ascoli Theorem to obtain that Σ is relatively compact. It
hence suffices to show that Σ is also closed, and we prove it by means of contradiction. Letting
{σm}m be a sequence in Σ that converges to a limit written as σ∗. Suppose that σ∗ /∈ Σ. Then, for
any i ∈ N and k ∈ A, we should have σ∗ik(S; θ) 6= σ∗pi(i)k(pi(S); θ). However, σm ∈ Σ for any m
implies that σmik(S; θ) = σ
m
pi(i)k(pi(S); θ) for any m, hence leading to σ
∗
ik(S; θ) = σ
∗
pi(i)k(pi(S); θ) by
continuity. This, as a result, establishes the desired contradiction.
Step 5. A canonical application of the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1: The proof is a modification of the argument in [9], let Vi(Xi, Zik, S)
and V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) be that Vi(Xi, Zik, S) 6= V ′i (Xi, Zik, S), by Assumption 3.3.2, ∃ l ∈ A and Zil
process an everywhere positive Lebesgue density conditional on S\{Zil} and Vi and V ′i are strictly
increasing with respect to Zil. Then by Assumption 3.3.1 and the argument in Matzkin (1993),
there exist a set S˜ ⊂ S with positive Lebesgue measure such that ∀S ∈ S˜, either
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) > Vi(Xi, Zil, S) and V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) < V
′
i (Xi, Zil, S)
or
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) < Vi(Xi, Zil, S) and V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) > V
′
i (Xi, Zil, S).
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Suppose without loss of generality that the first case holds, by Assumption 3.2.2, Fih|S(·) is strictly
increasing. Then we can get
Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zik, S)− Vi(Xi, Zil, S)) > Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zil, S)− Vi(Xi, Zik, S))
and
Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zik, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S)) > Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zil, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S)).
Hence,
σik(S; θ)− σil(S; θ) =
∫
∈R
[∏
h6=k
Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zik, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S))
]
fik|S()d
−
∫
∈R
[∏
h6=l
Fih|S(+ Vi(Xi, Zil, S)− Vi(Xi, Zih, S))
]
fih|S()d
> 0.
Therefore,
Vi(Xi, Zik, S) > Vi(Xi, Zil, S) =⇒ σik(S; θ) > σil(S; θ)
Similarly we can prove that
V ′i (Xi, Zik, S) < V
′
i (Xi, Zil, S) =⇒ σik(S; θ′) < σil(S; θ′)
So for all S ∈ S either
σik(S; θ) 6= σik(S; θ′)
or
σil(S; θ) 6= σil(S; θ′)
Thus we have identified Vik(Xi, Zik, S) for all k ∈ A and i ∈ N .
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B.2 Nonparametric estimation
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1:
φˆik(S)− φik(S) =
n∑
j 6=i
σˆjk(S)γ(Hij)−
n∑
j 6=i
σjk(S)γ(Hij) =
n∑
j 6=i
[σˆjk(S)− σjk(S)]γ(Hij)
=
n∑
j 6=i

∑n
l=1 1(Yl = k)K(
Sl−Sj
h1
)∑n
l=1K
(
Sl−Sj
h1
) − E[1(Yj = k)|S]
 γ(Hij)
=
1
nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
{
1(Yl = k)− E[1(Yj = k)|S]
fˆ(Sl)
}
K
(
Sl − Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
=
1
nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
{
1(Yl = k)− E[1(Yl = k)|S]
f(Sl)
}
K
(
Sl − Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)+
n∑
j 6=i
 1nh1
n∑
l=1
E[1(Yl = k)|S]K
(
Sl−Sj
h1
)
fˆ(Sl)
− E[1(Yj = k)|S]
 γ(Hij) + (s.o.)
≡ An1 + An2 + (s.o.),
where (s.o.) denotes the terms of smaller order. We first show that An1 = Op(1/
√
n), note that by
Law of Iterated Expectation
E(An1) = E(E(An1|S))
= E
[
1
nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
{
E[1(Yl = k)|S]− E[1(Yl = k)|S]
f(Sl)
}
K
(
Sl − Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
]
= 0.
since
∑n
j 6=i γ(Hij) = 1. To simplify notation define
Klj = K
(
Sl − Sj
h1
)
(B.1)
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and
Dlji =
{
1(Yl = k)− E[1(Yl = k)|S]
f(Sl)
}
Kljγ(Hij). (B.2)
Then we have
V ar(An1|S) = 1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
n∑
m=1
n∑
o 6=p
Cov [Dlji, Dmop|S]
=
1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
V ar [Dlij|S] + 1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
n∑
o 6=p
Cov [Dlji, Dlop|S] +
1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
m=1
n∑
j 6=i,p
Cov [Dlji, Dmjp|S] + (s.o.)
≡ Bn1 +Bn2 +Bn3 + (s.o.).
Since E(Dlji|S) = 0,
Bn1 =
1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
E(D2lji|S)
=
1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
E[1(Yl = k)|S] · {1− E[1(Yl = k)|S]}
f 2(Sl)
K2ljγ
2(Hij)
≤ 1
4n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
K2ljγ
2(Hij)
f 2(Sl)
Since f(·) is bounded away from zero, we know for some C <∞,
E(Bn1) = E[E(Bn1|Si, Sj)]
≤ C
4n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
∫ ∫
γ2(Hij)
(∫
K2ljf(Sl|Si, Sj)dSl
)
f(Si)f(Sj)dSidSj
=
C
4n2h1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
∫ ∫
γ2(Hij)
(∫
K2(v)f(Sj + h1v)dv
)
f(Si)f(Sj)dSidSj
= O
(
1
nh1
)
.
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Similarly,
Bn2 =
1
n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
n∑
o 6=p
E(DljiDlop|S)
≤ 1
4n2h21
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
n∑
o 6=p
KljKloγ(Hij)γ(Hpo)
f(Sj)f(So)
and then
E(Bn2)
≤ C
4n2h21
n∑
i=1
n∑
j 6=i
n∑
o 6=p
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
KljKloγ(Hij)γ(Hpo)f(Sl)f(Sj)f(So)f(Sp)dSldSjdSodSp
= O
(
1
n
)
.
Following a similar argument we can show that E(Bn3) = Op(1/n), hence by the law of total
variance,
V ar(An1) = E[V ar(An1)] + V ar[E(An1)]
= E(Bn1) + E(Bn2) + E(Bn3)
= O
(
1
nh1
)
+O
(
1
n
)
+O
(
1
n
)
= O
(
1
nh1
)
.
Hence An1 = Op(1/
√
nh1).
By condition (b), we know that ρnk(Si, S−i) is s-times differentiable and the derivatives are
uniformly bounded. Then in order to do multivariate Taylor expansion, we first introduce some
multi-index notations: for α ∈ Nd+q(K+1) and Si ∈ Rd+q(K+1), define the sth order derivative of
ρnk(Si, S−i) at Si as
ρ
(α)
nk (Si) ≡
∂|α|ρnk
∂Sα1i1 ∂S
α2
i2 · · · ∂S
αd+q(K+1)
i(d+q(K+1))
, |α| ≤ s
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where |α| = ∑d+q(K+1)i=1 αi and Sij denotes the jth component of Si. Also let α! = ∏d+q(K+1)i=1 αi!
and Sα =
∏d+q(K+1)
i=1 S
αi
i . Then by Taylor expansion of σlk(S; θ) at Sj ,
σlk(S; θ) = ρnk(Sl, S−l) = ρnk(Sj, S−l) +
∑
1≤|b|<s
ρbnk(Sj)
b!
(Sl − Sj)b +
∑
|b|=s
Cb(Sm)(Sl − Sj)b
where limSm→Sj Cb(Sl) = 0. By symmetry, ρnk(Sj, S−l) = σjk(S; θ), hence
An2 =
n∑
j 6=i
 1nh1
n∑
l=1
K
(
Sl−Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
fˆ(Sj)
E[1(Yj = k)|S]− E[1(Yj = k)|S]
+
1
nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
∑
1≤|b|<s
ρbnk(Sj)
b!
(Sl − Sj)bK
(
Sl−Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
fˆ(Sj)
+
1
nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
∑
|b|=s
Cb(Sl)(Sl − Sj)bK
(
Sl−Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
fˆ(Sj)
≤
∑
1≤|b|≤s
Bb
b!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
(Sl − Sj)bK
(
Sl−Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
fˆ(Sj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
1≤|b|≤s
Bb
b!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1nh1
n∑
l=1
n∑
j 6=i
(Sl − Sj)bK
(
Sl−Sj
h1
)
γ(Hij)
fˆ(Sj)
− E[(Sj − Si)b]
∣∣∣∣∣∣+∑
1≤|b|≤s
Bb
b!
∣∣E[(Sj − Si)b]∣∣
where the term Bb is the upper bound for ρbnk(Si) and maxl∈N Cb(Sl) < Bb. By standard argument
of Taylor expansion and change of variables, we have
An2 = Op
 1√
nh1
+
d+q(K+1)∑
r=1
hv1r
 .
Hence
φˆik(S)− φik(S) = Op
 1√
nh1
+
d+q(K+1)∑
r=1
hv1r
 = op(1). (B.3)
102
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1: Let
Q∗n(θ, φ) ≡
1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
1(Yi = k)
K∑
h6=k
1
(
φTi θk > φ
T
i θh
)
.
Then by Triangle inequality,
sup
θ∈Θ
|Qn(θ, φˆ, h2)−Q(θ, φ)|
≤ sup
θ∈Θ
[|Qn(θ, φˆ, h2)−Qn(θ, φ, h2)|+ |Qn(θ, φ, h2)−Q∗n(θ, φ)|+ |Q∗n(θ, φ)−Q(θ, φ)|]
≤ sup
θ∈Θ
|Qn(θ, φˆ, h2)−Qn(θ, φ, h2)|+ sup
θ∈Θ
|Qn(θ, φ, h2)−Q∗n(θ, φ)|
+ sup
θ∈Θ
|Q∗n(θ, φ)−Q(θ, φ)|
≡ An1 + An2 + An3.
Next we need to prove that Ani = op(1) for i = 1, 2, 3.
An1 = supθ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑ni=1∑Kk=1 1(Yi = k)∑Kh6=kG
(
φˆTi θk − φˆTi θh
h2
)
− 1
n
∑n
i=1
∑K
k=1 1(Yi = k)
∑K
h6=kG
(
φTi θk − φTi θh
h2
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n1(Yi = k)
[
G
(
φˆTi θk − φˆTi θh
h2
)
−G
(
φTi θk − φTi θh
h2
)]∣∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
[
G
(
φˆTi θk − φˆTi θh
h2
)
−G
(
φTi θk − φTi θh
h2
)]∣∣∣∣∣ .
By condition G3,
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
[
G
(
φˆTi θk − φˆTi θh
h2
)
−G
(
φTi θk − φTi θh
h2
)]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣ φˆTi θk − φˆTi θhnh2 − φ
T
i θk − φTi θh
nh2
∣∣∣∣∣
= c ·
∣∣∣∣∣(φˆTi − φTi ) · (θk − θh)nh2
∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1)
by Theorem 3.4.1, Assumption 3.4.3 and Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality. Thus we know An1 = op(1)
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by Slutsky’s theorem.
An2 = supθ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣ 1n∑ni=1∑Kk=1 1(Yi = k)∑Kh6=kG(φTi θk − φTi θhh2
)
− 1
n
∑n
i=1
∑K
k=1 1(Yi = k)
∑K
h6=k 1
(
φTi θk > φ
T
i θh
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣G(φTi θk − φTi θhh2
)
− 1 (φTi θk > φTi θh)∣∣∣∣
≡ Bn1(a) +Bn2(a),
where
Bn1(a) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣G(φTi θk − φTi θhh2
)
− 1 (φTi θk > φTi θh)∣∣∣∣ · 1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| > a)
and
Bn2(a) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣G(φTi θk − φTi θhh2
)
− 1 (φTi θk > φTi θh)∣∣∣∣ · 1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a).
Since limn→∞ h2 = 0, conditions G1 and G2 imply that Bn1(a) → 0 for each a > 0 as n → ∞.
As for Bn2(a), since by condition G1, G(·) is bounded by M , we know
Bn2(a) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
M · sup
θ∈Θ
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a)
= M
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
θ∈Θ
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a).
By Lemma 2.6.17 and 2.6.18 in [62], we know {1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a) : θ ∈ Θ} is VC-
subgraph given Assumption 3.4.1. Thus Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 2.4.3 in
[62]) implies that
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a)− E
[
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a)
]∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1). (B.4)
Let r(·) : Z 7→ Θ be such that r(Zil) = vi(Zil, S\{Zil}). Then r−1(·) exists by Assumption
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3.3.2, thus by Triangle Inequality and Law of Iterated Expectation,
E
[
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a)
] ≤ ∫
s∈S
[∫ r−1(a)
r−1(−a)
|φTi θk|+ |φTi θh|fZil|S(z)dz
]
fS(s)ds, (B.5)
where fZil|S(·) denotes the conditional density function of Zil given S and fS(·) is the density
function of S. By Assumption 3.3.2, the integral in brackets of (B.5) is continuous, hence
by making a arbitrarily close to 0, it will converge to 0 uniformly over θ ∈ Θ. Since it is
also bounded by 1, using Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem, we can immediately get
E
[
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a)
]
converges to 0 uniformly over θ ∈ Θ. Thus by (B.4),
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
1(|φTi θk − φTi θh| ≤ a)
∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1).
Again by Slutsky’s Theorem, Bn2(a) = op(1), so An2 = op(1) as well.
An3 = supθ∈Θ
∣∣∣ 1n∑ni=1∑Kk=1 1(Yi = k)∑Kh6=k 1 (φTi θk > φTi θh)− E [∑Kk=1 1(Yi = k)∑Kh6=k 1(φTi θk > φTi θh)]∣∣∣
≤
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
1(Yi = k) · 1
(
φTi θk > φ
T
i θh
)− E [1(Yi = k) · 1 (φTi θk > φTi θh)]
∣∣∣∣∣
= op(1)
by Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem. Consequently,
sup
θ∈Θ
|Qn(θ, φˆ, h2)−Q(θ, φ)| = An1 + An2 + An3 = op(1).
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Proof of Lemma 3.4.2: By Law of Iterated Expectation and Assumption 3.3.2,
Q(θ, φ) = E
[
K∑
k=1
1(Yi = k)
K∑
h6=k
1(φTi θk > φ
T
i θh)
]
=
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
∫
s∈S
[∫ ∞
r−1(φTi θh)
1(Yi = k)fZil|S(z)dz
]
fS(s)ds.
Since r(·) : Z 7→ Θ is continuous and strictly increasing by Assumption 3.2.5, r−1(·) : Θ 7→ Z is
also continuous. By Assumption 3.4.2, Θ is compact with respect to ‖·‖Θ, thus r−1(·) is uniformly
continuous. Suppose there exists a sequence of functions {θnh}n∈N in Θ and ‖θnh − θh‖Θ → 0 as
n→∞. Then by Assumption 3.4.2,
sup
θ∈Θ
‖θnh − θh‖Θ = o(1). (B.6)
By definition of uniform continuity, ∃ δ > 0 such that if ‖θnh − θh‖Θ < δ, then
|r−1(φTi θnh)− r−1(φTi θh)| <  (B.7)
for all  > 0. By (B.6), ∃ n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0,
sup
θ∈Θ
‖θnh − θh‖Θ < δ,
then (B.7) will hold. Define rn(Zil) = φTi θnh, and then by Triangle Inequality and (B.7),
sup
θ∈Θ
|r−1n (φTi θnh)− r−1(φTi θh)|
≤ sup
θ∈Θ
|r−1n (φTi θnh)− r−1(φTi θnh)|+ sup
θ∈Θ
|r−1(φTi θnh)− r−1(φTi θh)|
≤ sup
θ∈Θ
|r−1(φTi θnh)− r−1(φTi θh)|
< .
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Since  > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that r−1n (φ
T
i θnh)→ r−1(φTi θh) uniformly over θ ∈ Θ. Hence
by Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem,
∫ ∞
r−1n (φTi θnh)
1(Yi = k)fZil|S(z)dz −
∫ ∞
r−1(φTi θh)
1(Yi = k)fZil|S(z)dz = o(1).
Thus the integral in brackets is continuous in θ. Since this integral is also bounded by 1, again by
Dominated Convergence Theorem, we conclude that Q(θ, φ) is continuous in θ.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3: Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, we know
Pr(φTi θk = φ
T
i θh) =
∫
s∈S
[∫ r−1(φTi θh)
r−1(φTi θh)
fZil|S(z)dz
]
fS(s)ds = 0. (B.8)
Using Law of Iterated Expectation, rewrite Q(θ, φ) as
Q(θ, φ) =
K∑
k=1
K∑
h6=k
E
[
σik(S; θ)1(φ
T
i θk > φ
T
i θh)
]
. (B.9)
By Theorem 3.3.1, we know θ∗ is identified, thus by the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, we can get
φTi θ
∗
k > φ
T
i θ
∗
h ⇐⇒ σik(S; θ∗) > σih(S; θ∗)
for any (k, h) ∈ A×A such that k 6= h. Therefore, Q(θ, φ) will be globally maximized by θ∗ since
there is no tie in choice probability. Now we need to prove that Q(θ, φ) is uniquely maximzed by
θ∗, suppose by contradication there exists another θ′ ∈ Θ such that θ′ 6= θ∗ and θ′ maximizes
Q(θ, φ). Then by the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, we know there will exist some (k, l) ∈ A× A such
that
φTi θ
∗
k > φ
T
i θ
∗
l and φ
T
i θ
′
k < φ
T
i θ
′
l
or
φTi θ
∗
k < φ
T
i θ
∗
l and φ
T
i θ
′
k > φ
T
i θ
′
l.
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Therefore, it is not possible for θ′ to maximize Q(θ, φ) as well, this is a contradiction, so we can
conclude that Q(θ, φ) will be uniquely maximized by θ∗.
B.3 Semiparametric estimation
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3: Under our setting, {Yi}i∈N is not an independent random sequence.
Therefore, the results in [12] cannot be directly used. However, since Yi ⊥ Yj conditional on S
for all i 6= j, we can instead derive the conditional asymptotic distribution of θˆ1 and show that
asymptotically the conditional and unconditional distribution θˆ are equivalent.
Let θˆ be a smoothed maximum score estimator. Then we know with probability approaching
1, Bn(θˆ, φˆ1, h2) = 0, hence by Taylor expansion,
Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2) +Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2)(θˆ − θ) = 0, (B.10)
where θ˜ lies between θ and θˆ. Therefore,
√
nh2Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2) +Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2)
√
nh2(θˆ − θ) = 0. (B.11)
Then we have
√
nh2(θˆ − θ) = −Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2)−1
√
nh2Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)
= −Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2)−1
√
nh2{Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)− E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S] + E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S]}
≡ −Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2)−1
√
nh2{Cn + E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S]}. (B.12)
We first show that
√
nh2Cn = op(1), Let
bi(θ, φˆ1, h2) = [2 · 1(Yi = 1)− 1]
(
w˜i1
h2
)
G′
(
wTi1θ
h2
)
. (B.13)
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Then
√
nh2Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2) = (
√
h2/n)
∑n
i=1 bi(θ, φˆ1, h2). By Law of Iterated Expectation
E(
√
nh2Cn) = 0. (B.14)
E[(
√
nh2Cn)
2] = E{E[(
√
nh2Cn)
2|S]}
=
h2
n
E
E
( n∑
i=1
bi(θ, φˆ1, h2)− E(bi(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S)
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣S

=
h2
n
n∑
i=1
E
{
E
[(
bi(θ, φˆ1, h2)− E(bi(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S)
)2∣∣∣∣S]}
= o(1),
where the third equality is by conditional independence and the fact that
E[bi(θ, φˆ1, h2) − E(bi(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S)|S] = 0 and the last equality is because V ar(bi(θ, φˆ1, h2)) is
bounded by Assumption 3.4.4. Hence
√
nh2Cn = op(1). (B.15)
By Law of Iterated Expectation and Mean Value Theorem,
√
nh2E{E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S]}
=
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)]
=
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φ1, h2)] +
√
nh2
∂E[Bn(θ, φ˜1, h2)]
∂φ1
(φˆ1 − φ1),
where φ˜1 is between φˆ1 and φ1. By Assumption 3.4.5,
√
nh2(φˆ1 − φ1) = op(1) and ∂E[Bn(θ,φ˜1,h2)]∂φ1
is bounded by Condition G4 and Assumption 3.4.4, hence we know
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)] =
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φ1, h2)] + op(1). (B.16)
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By Lemma 5 in [12],
lim
n→∞
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φ1, h2)] =
√
λB.
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)] =
√
λB + op(1). (B.17)
Consequently, by Lebegesue Dominated Convergence Theorem and Lemma 5 in Horowitz (1992),
lim
n→∞
V ar{
√
nh2E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S]} = D + op(1). (B.18)
By (B.17) and (B.18) and apply Lindeberg-Feller’s Central Limit Theorem, we have
D−
1
2
√
nh2[E[Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2)|S]− E(Bn(θ, φˆ1, h2))] d−→ N (0, Id+q), (B.19)
where Id+q is an identify matrix with dimension d + q. Furthermore it is easy to verify that if
φˆ1 − φ1 = op(1). Then
Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2)−Hn(θ˜, φ1, h2) = op(1)
by condition G4. Hence by Law of Iterated Expectation and Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 in [12], the
stochastic equicontinuity of Hn(θ, φˆ1, h2) holds at θ and then we know
Hn(θ˜, φˆ1, h2) = H + op(1) (B.20)
since θˆ is a consistent estimator for θ. By Slutsky’s Theorem, (B.12), (B.19), (B.20) together imply
that √
nh2(θˆ − θ) d−→ N (−
√
λH−1B,H−1DH−1).
110
